No matter how much it catches on, there will still be people who have no idea what it is, and even if they have it, someone else may have set it up for them so they wouldn't need to know. Even if someone can prove you did understand the literal meaning of the question, you can always plausibly argue that you didn't understand why it was being asked in relation to the questioner's official investigative authority.
> you can always plausibly argue that you didn't understand why it was being asked in relation to the questioner's official investigative authority.
I don't think this is a defense. If it is a defense, they'll just preface the question with, "In order to safeguard national security, I need to know if you have any hidden accounts on here that aren't readily visible. Are there any?" Federal agents don't have to warn people that they might be prosecuted for lying. Also, if you lie to a border agent and you are anything other than a US citizen, that can be grounds to revoke your visa and ban you from the country.
> Although you must know that your statement is false at the time you make it in order to be guilty of this crime, you do not have to know that lying to the government is a crime or even that the matter you are lying about is "within the jurisdiction" of a government agency. For example, if you lie to your employer on your time and attendance records and, unbeknownst to you, he submits your records, along with those of other employees, to the federal government pursuant to some regulatory duty, you could be criminally liable.
https://www.wisenberglaw.com/Articles/How-to-Avoid-Going-to-...
Border agents are overstepping their granted authority when inspecting the data contents of an information-storage device, so I'd argue that if you lie to them as they are doing it, they are no longer acting in their capacity as a federal agent. Probably not an argument that a federal judge would agree with, but I can have my own non-lawyerly opinions on it. As it is also my opinion that if you keep a law on the books making it illegal to lie to federal agents, you must also have a law on the books saying that it is illegal for any federal agent to retaliate against or administratively punish any person for failing to answer questions. So, as an ancestor post mentioned, when the likely effect of a non-answer is to draw additional attention, that's clearly unfair to the traveler and their right against self-incrimination.
All that is beyond the ken of the people actually interacting at the borders, so the only solution is to order their boss's boss's boss to write a memo, to pass down the chain of command, saying, "Stop doing this. It is not allowed."
As it is now, the executive will continue to do as it pleases, without regard to folks rationally debating legality on the internet, and neither the judiciary nor the legislature is likely to bother to check it. So the only reliable short-term solution is to not carry such devices across the border at all. When the cops are stupid and cruel, following the law is not a defense. Appeasing them is not a defense. Fighting them is not a defense. There is no defense wherever they can still operate under the guise of legitimate authority. As a traveler, you are completely powerless. And that is unfair, and not something I am willing to tolerate from the US feds. But they don't exactly pay much attention to me with respect to such things--it's okay to step on nobodies; only the people with money matter to them now.
I think about this issue sometimes, and it always ends up coming back to how much power enforcement has if they do not yet have proof. If they can torture you without any sort of proof, then no hardware or software solution can protect both you and your data.
It sucks that it has come to this, but short of legislative changes I don't think there is any other practical way to guarantee security of data at the border other than sticking it in the cloud and downloading on arrival, or using hidden volumes and not mentioning them. Even the cloud isn't really safe compared to hidden volumes - they can always ask about those too.
I think the risk is low for a random person, but if you're Julian Assange or someone equally interesting to the feds, and are known to use relatively sophisticated cryptography all the time, and an image of a phone taken at the border turns up evidence of a large encrypted partition that you denied existence of, I wouldn't put it past a prosecutor to put it to a grand jury and come out with an indictment.
This also means they're not carrying their usual laptop with a bunch of sensitive things on it... and honestly that a serious chunk of the data loss problem with security it seems, folks with lots of data that straight up doesn't need to go places....
Several of my employers had HR folks with their laptops stolen. Like why did the HR person need to take a laptop downtown... and leave it in their car ... with my SSN and everything else on it. Hell why do they need it on the laptop locally EVER? (well the answer is they don't know how to do anything except work in excel files, but that's is its own problem)
It seems like the clear workaround is to ask travelers if this is the case, and to ask for their passwords to any popular sites that provide this service. A clean laptop workspace* is suspicious on its own.
I suppose you could lie about it, gamble that they would have no way of knowing that you're lying. But that's not a fun game to play long term.
So someone wanting to hide something will simply create false 'clean' accounts they can provide access to, while keeping the stuff they want hidden, hidden. Meanwhile, innocent people are getting their security compromised and privacy violated.
Even worse, the authorities could claim the sites they did provide passwords to are 'too clean' and thus they must be hiding something and hold them ... until they give up passwords to accounts that may not even exist?
When I was in public school, the school blocked several popular sites from the school network. As an unintended result, it provided me a great education about DNS, forward and reverse proxy servers, VPNs, and related tech as I figured out the dozens of ways to work around the blocks. Think the same thing wouldn't happen here?
All you're left with is catching only the stupidest criminals, violating the privacy of innocent people, more than likely finding a bunch of false positives of whatever you're looking for, and at the same time forcing the actual criminals to become smarter about their opsec (making it harder to catch them -- in general, not just at the border) and still not catching them.
If the thing simply isn't there on the device, generally speaking as far as a typical border search goes I think legally it ends there.
Otherwise your workaround would work for ... everything as it is now, but that's not how they operate at scale.
It's 2019, people. "The network is the computer" was 20 years ago. Kubernetes is the new Linux. Why are people keeping sensitive personal data on a personal computer, the same computer they presumably use to browse the web, and the same one they're worried will be unlawfully accessed at borders or foreign destinations. ssh is still a thing and Wayland hasn't even killed X Windows, yet.
I have my own physical servers (pcengines APUs are cheap and reliable; I have like 4 running at the moment), and smartcards to authenticate for remote access to my colocated, locked-down machines.
Not sure of how to do with a mobile device such as android yet.
But what I describe is possible on Macs and MS WIndows and Linux..
Of course it goes without saying not to leave a sarcastic acid readme to cbp as a readme.txt file o the desktop they are searching
It’s a inconvenience but the reality is the legal climate for privacy is abysmal.
I hope it changes, but until then, your best bet is to stay well within the law and not make an example out of yourself.