Signal, a fast, secure and simple messenger endorsed by Snowden
signal.org
signal.org
iOS users are still out of luck on message backup too :c
Just speculation, but after reading about this app I would be kind of shocked if slack wasn’t at least an order of magnitude more popular, so not a very apt comparison I’d say.
The app also doesn’t work if you have multiple phones or a tablet. I can have signal either on my iPad or my phone. Not both. Why? I don’t know. But Signal insists that it is more secure.
It’s a problem with these security focused applications. They often sacrifice usability on the altar of best case security; making applications that are hard to use for anyone but the most ardent of folks.
I want to love this app, but their bad UX makes it really really hard.
Take a peek at my other comment perhaps, signal-weechat & pyre.chat might be of use
I do admit the rest of the experience has improved, although the ban from binding more a single device to an account is still preventing me from using it more.
Signal does need serious help on the backup/restore process, iOS users are left in the cold and Android backups often fail when one attempts to restore them.
I've followed up on issues on Signal Android about backups being borked (even getting Moxie to fix a bug at one point) but backups are obviously not a priority for the Signal Foundation. Very frustrating, and it has caused my friends and acquaintances to ragequit Signal in some cases.
So looks like signal is the least of all evils at the moment
https://github.com/thefinn93/signal-weechat
Signal makes for a decent SMS replacement, IMO they have put little effort into being a group chat competitor. Some bots like https://git.callpipe.com/yosl/repost4privacy can make groups more user friendly, but group management is still poor.
Edit: added last paragraph about groups.
> Not both. Why? I don’t know. But Signal insists that it is more secure.
It's because the provisioning support is only implemented in the JavaScript "SDK" (in scare-quotes because we all know Moxie is very hostile to users using apps other than the one they publish).
Not only that, there were PRs that implemented the core functionality required and Moxie effectively said that the author was too inexperienced for the patch to even be worth reviewing[1]. There are third-party signal clients[2] which use that patch to allow for you to create "virtual devices" in your shell and thus (in theory) script signal chats or create Matrix bridges (I hope to do the latter at some point).
[1]: https://github.com/signalapp/libsignal-service-java/pull/21 [2]: https://github.com/AsamK/signal-cli
I actually feel like Signal has done a better job than most in this respect. The interface is attractive, they make things like key resetting reasonably parseable, and there are nice mainstream features like built-in gif searching.
That said I've fought with syncing problems at times, mostly surrounding the desktop app. Presumably it has to do with the authoritative copy being phones in peer to peer mode, instead of a server, but it's still pretty annoying sometimes.
If you seriously care about privacy, when you look at chat app features, think "how would an ordinary developer be most likely to implement this feature, and what would that mean the application was tracking about me as a consequence?" One nice thing about Signal is that as a general rule, you can assume they're not trading privacy for convenience.
It is also reasonable not to care as much about privacy as Signal does. If you want something with more UX niceties, but something close to (and, in most cases, cribbed from) Signal's security model, Wire is a good bet. Just remember, Wire has a lot of metadata about who you're talking to that Signal would treat as hazmat.
I recently got signal because some friends made me. Given how old it is, I was shocked by how poor some aspects are.
I liked using it as an android sms app, until I replied to one too many sms over signal because signal always defaults to signal, rather than whichever protocol the person sent you a message via. People uninstall the app, or use iOS. Signal constantly defaulting to a protocol the person on the other end isn't using was too much, so I stopped using signal as my sms app.
I hate that, now that I've stopped using signal as my sms app, it wasn't storing sms in android's common sms store. Now chunks of history are missing, trapped in signal.
The desktop client seems fundamentally broken, often taking 5-10 minutes to sync messages in.
I hate that I can only mute conversations for 1 or 2 hours, 1 or 7 days, 1 year, or forever.
I hate that I can't mute a group and still receive @s.
I hate that it is tied to my phone number.
I think signal offers a really bad experience. I prefer keybase, for many reasons. However when my mother and sister and grandmother needed a way to share pictures and videos (which mms would convert to garbage quality), I set them up with signal. Keybase's mobile client is, unfortunately, specifically bad at media. Signal is decent at it.
Although, the keybase devs as recently as yesterday said they'll be polishing the mobile experience in the coming weeks. Maybe soon I can in good conscience not recommend signal and start pushing keybase among my family. Keybase did also recently streamlined their onboarding process to not require a password- you can just download and go.
Edited for spelling errors.
On-boarding of keybase was more complicated before, maybe its better now.
I could write more critique regarding the forced contact discovery, the use of phone numbers as identifiers, but at lest the underlying security of the app is good.
That meant you would only use Signal, and the recipient would receive the message via Signal if he too was a user. Basically it worked like iMessage on iOS, but was 100% OSS.
Which from what I can tell, is a thing people here on HN (not to mention /r/Android) are asking for all the time.
Using Signal on iOS though indeed feels weirder because you always need to “discover” who has what IM-service, and then start the corresponding app.
That’s a flaw of iOS though, and not Signal, and all non-iMessage services suffers for that.
I agree the permissions (especially the forced contact discovery) is problematic.
And then I gave up because of the forced contact discovery... it's a pity.
I wish there was a popular chat service that worked more like Blackberry. Central network but just pseudonymns instead of the phone number.
..for what?
Occasionally, when an SMS arrives, the Messages app will crash, suggesting to me that Messages is still playing a roll in handling text messages on my Android phone.
Where is the line between Messages app and Signal?
But, I love the idea and signal is the only app I use for messaging, so obviously these things don't bother me that much :)
If I didn't trust their security measure the most, I wouldn't use it.
Check out my other comment about it: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19894385
[1]: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/127 [2]: https://signal.org/android/apk/
1. The Signal backup restore process is ridiculous and kludgey. It took me quite some time to figure out how /Internal works on Android 9 devices using the files app for example. [1]
2. If your phone fails without a backup the only way to rejoin groups is having people post a message to each group. I wish there was a middle ground between full backup and dump my keys/group list.[2]
3. The Linux app will, at random, take minutes to load because it is loading 100s of messages. But, this happens even if I was running the app 5 minutes before. Watching the logs I see sqlite insertions happening no faster than 10 a second. The old web based Signal client worked great. I would love to have that brought back.
On my wishlist, which I haven't posted anywhere publicly, includes:
1. Clicking a contact circle _should not_ show me the Android contact, it should show me a list of actions I can take in Signal instead: call, message, video call
2. Video conferences are often used with families. Please create a full screen video call mode that is friendly for parents with kids. This means that I can let my kid touch the screen and not immediately drop a call or switch apps. A full screen mode with optional pin or swipe pattern to exit would make me love the app forever.
Also, for context, my experience comes from converting dozens of family members off of Whatsapp to Signal over the course of 6 weeks earlier this year. For the most part it has been fine but these sharp edges have caused me pain trying to support my family members. Whatapp lost my trust with the announcement of Fb messenger integration and the unencrypted backup to Google Drive.
I am hopeful that Signal will improve overtime. However, the web client deprecation and my recent experience with the backup/restore process has me concerned.
[1] https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007059752#an...
[2] https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007062012-Ne...
I like and push signal every chance i can get but yeah, the UI/UX is horrible at times.
Also wtf should we pay attention to snowden's opinion. the guy is no "security guru". His name is only relevent because he uses it... so what?
“Federated architecture (FA) is a pattern in enterprise architecture that allows interoperability and information sharing between semi-autonomous de-centrally organized lines of business (LOBs), information technology systems and applications.“
—Wikipedia
In addition, if you wanted something federated with decent crypto, an xmpp server with something as basic as TLS and OTR on the server and clients would be far more usable than matrix.
> Even if you are not a Quicksy user you can enter your Jabber ID into the Quicksy Directory and give Quicksy users the ability to automatically discover you based on your phone number. This lets you enjoy the privacy-friendly, federated nature of Jabber/XMPP while giving your less tech-savvy friends a low barrier entry into that world
// not affiliated; saw this recently, like the idea.
We're stuck with alternatives, that the crowd doesn't prefer.
Now matrix on the other hand seems like the next step for us nerds, so far less available than Signal.
Don't trust anything you read online, if you need guidance try to reach out to trusted and well regarded experts in privacy and security ecosystems and do it in the real world face to face, not online. Cryptome has a decent faq on this.
Signal is connected to your phone number. That's game over right there and then on any claims to security and anonymity. Things directly connected to your identity in an insecure OS as Android cannot deliver security or anonymity, and its dangerous to lull others into a false sense of security.
Right now, that title belongs to Briar in my opinion - it has a far more satisfactory security model in my opinion.
Past discussion here on HN: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17723973
Just posting for discussion. For me, the fact that Signal can only be downloaded via Google Play and not F-Droid. is a major blocker.
For that reason I run a Matrix/synapse instance and that's what I use for day to day text based communication. Matrix clients have some issues and aren't as user friendly as Signal's IMHO, but they're getting better and better.
That said, I don't think federation actually contributes to security. My instance is firewalled off from being discoverable by the larger Matrix community, mainly because my instance is for close friends and family.
I can't really comment on what he brings up about the Signal founder -- not very familiar with him..
Or, people will conclude that everything is compromised anyway, and therefore not take the reasonable steps because “why bother?”
I also don’t think the idea that all hardware is compromised should just be accepted as fact. There is more that speaks against that thesis than in its favor, including the high market value of iOS exploits and the length Apple and the FBI went to in their fight over that shooter’s iPhone.
Apple especially has taken some steps that seem to deserve some credit. After all, if we refuse to see the differences in their approach to others’, they (and everyone else) will just learn from it not to even try making privacy part of the value proposition.
What specific platforms, and what are their insecurities?
Welp, guess I should just send my messages in the clear then rather than make them work for them
Good security advice is about harm reduction.
Security advice is not "bad" because it does not achieve perfect security.
Using Signal instead of an app the government can access through subpoenas (Facebook Messenger), that is closed source (iMessage) or transmits in the clear (traditional SMS) is good advice because it reduces harm and reduces risk.
(Simple scenario: journalist was told by experts that such-and-such is secure, without qualification, so journalist uses it in some ways that they would not, had they been given a more accurate characterization.)
I'm not sure I follow your logic. Maybe you can help me out a bit?
There are four quotes on the linked page. Which one do you feel overstated the security of Signal, and why?
Its amazing how paranoid some people are
What else ?
Does signal use the quantum-proof variety of encryption?
The largest QCs are on the order of tens of qubits, but in order to run Shor's algorithm (to break RSA, or the discrete-log equivalent to break Diffie-Hellman) you need hundreds or thousands of stable qubits -- and the current generation of qubits are unstable. You can make stable qubits out of unstable ones by using error correction, but that requires you to have ~1000 unstable qubits to make one stable qubit. So there's at least 5-6 orders of magnitude separating the current state-of-the-art and when classic public-key crypto will be broken.
> Does signal use the quantum-proof variety of encryption?
No, there is currently no trusted post-quantum encryption (though the real issue is finding a replacement for public-key crypto because that seems to be the weakest link where quantum computers appear to have the most power). It's being worked on but is a very new field. In addition most post-quantum systems require keys that are kilobytes or even gigabytes in size (elliptic curve keys are tens of bytes). djb (a very well-known cryptographer) and his colleagues give quite a few talks about this[1].
Funnily enough it appears that elliptic curves (which are harder for classic computers to break, and can be easier for classic computers to compute safely) are actually easier for QCs to break because the key sizes are so much smaller (meaning that fewer qubits are required).
To be clear, Google didn't experiment with actually using post-quantum crypto. Their experiment was to figure out what was the largest key sizes that browsers and networks would accept before you start degrading connections. Their "post-quantum keys" were just padding bytes. This was gone through in the Bernstein and Lange talk this year at 35C3[1]. This is a good thing, given the history of the security of post-quantum candidates[2].
[1]: https://youtu.be/ZCmnQR3_qWg?t=1457 [2]: https://youtu.be/ZCmnQR3_qWg?t=208
How hard will it be to switch to post quantum encryption globally once it’s clear publicly that there’s at least a proof of concept for a quantum decryption supercomputer? How do you differentiate between cloned 210 iq babies in massive underground communities (as an example) working on decades in the future tech, and safeguards amongst the destructive forces of the powerful hegemonic incumbency. There’s an applicable abstraction here, generally, about containing superior intelligence, whether artificial or biological. I do believe recent Star Trek movie touched upon this
In theory switching could be "simple" but depends very strongly on what post-quantum algorithms we end up with. If we have a good replacement for Diffie-Hellman (the current candidate appears to CSIDH[1]) then you could replace effectively everything with it because the protocols could be left unchanged. The keys might be a bit larger but who cares.
However, if there is no safe Diffie-Hellman replacement then we'll need to change our protocols to accommodate the new crypto. Symmetric-key crypto appears to be mostly safe (Grover's Algorithm can only provide a square-root improvement and so we can just double our key sizes to 256 or 512 bit) so we only need to fix the public-key part, and can work on replacing the rest later.
„Snowden didn’t just steal information about “domestic spying” operations. The truth is Snowden apparently stole many more files related to what most in the intelligence community and beyond see as legitimate, overseas spy operations — including anti-terror operations and those targeted against the U.S. by our enemies. He reportedly focused his theft on the most sensitive “Level 3” data that includes lists of sources and methods in China, Russia and Iran.
This is the type of information that “could invalidate America’s entire intelligence enterprise if it were placed in the hands of an adversary,” Esptein writes. He suggests Snowden would have known Booz-Allen Hamilton in Hawaii (his last contractor position) was one of the few contractor facilities that had the authority to hold “Level 3” data and former co-workers believe he took the lesser paying gig”
Given his circumstances at the time he did the best he could in balancing peoples right to know against legitimate stuff I think.
The most amazing thing about Snowden case was his access to information. Normally NSA employees have a combination of clearances: TS (top secret) and then SI (signals intelligence), TK (talent keyhole), and Gamma (with subcompartments).
But then they gave some IT staff like Snowden special "root access like" clearance called PRIVAC (Privileged Access) where people had access to all data collected. Snowden had open list of live feeds from all active operations, drone feeds and other information regardless of classification all over the world.
PRIVAC didn't have two man rule, restricted access to contractors or compartmentalization until Snowden came out and Senate hearings happened. NSA clearly prioritized cost and data collecting over security.
If there was actual spy in the same position as Snowden, or if Snowden really had the intention to spill everything to harm the US, the damage done would be catastrophic.
How do you know that? The only people who know what Snowden took are Snowden, the journalists, the NSA, and the foreign intelligence agencies who took the data from the journalists.
Nobody thinks Snowden had the intention to damage the US. He was just so stupid that he did it accidentally.
MY claim about what he took, however:"
Arrogant enough to leave breadcrumbs about how he didn’t take the “really damaging stuff” which would have increased the chance of a kinetic reaction. What can you get away with? Seem like you’re the good guy exposing weaknesses while attempting to claim no damage
Snowden handed over blueprints to global spying operations. It’s not an exaggeration to say that shtf since then. He’s a Russian operative at this point, if not premeditated
Honestly he could have just flown to “His” destination instead of HK she’ll game. He’s so careful yet he just goes public while still in HK? Haphazard disclosure like that doesn’t match his careful nature
Snowden committed treason. Act of war, full stop
You don’t credit the person who torched your imperfect building to the ground with forcing you to build a better building, placing you in some ways at a long term strategic disadvantage relative to your adversaries who are running with those blueprints