In the blunt form: language limits what we can say; Sapir-Whorf runs contrary to every-day experience. Sure, if ones native language contains le mos juste, it is easy to speak ones mind. But if not, the burden is not great. One must speak at greater length, using more words, and forming the intersections and unions of their meanings, to obtain the exact nuance that you intend. This is the routine craftsmanship of every wordsmith.
Early in the essay Kevin Simler posses a challenge "Here's an SIS network to play around with. Can you find its critical threshold?" What is most interesting is not the numerical value, lets just call it x. What is most interesting is that it is fairly sharply defined. If two idea are both fairly hard to transmit, and hence both close to x, we could easily have a situation in which the burden imposed by a missing mos juste makes all the difference. One idea has a transmissibility just above x and becomes an established staple of the culture. The other idea has a transmissibility just below x so it crops up from time to time but always dies out.
One looks around, admiring the cultural landscape. One idea is present, one absent. Why? Language! While it is wrong to claim that "a person's native language determines how he or she thinks", we have to take account of network criticality.
The much weakened Whorf-style claim that "a person's native language burdens their communications with trivial inconveniences" is plausible and unimportant at the individual level. But we may never-the-less find that "a social network's native language determines which thoughts die out and which ones take over most of the network."
Compare and contrast with Beware Trivial Inconveniences https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/reitXJgJXFzKpdKyd/beware-tri..., which claims that trivial inconviences have real world potency without needing the leverage provided by network effects.