Fooling Production-Grade Classification Systems with Adversarial Traffic Signs [pdf]
arxiv.org
arxiv.org
And stickered.
And those ones you sometimes find in malls, apartment complexes, or office parks that are an architectural standard sign with the traffic control sign symbol painted on one side, so you can't identify what the sign is from other angles. I hate those.
At some point, not now, we will accept what the machine says. Machines will be better (faster and more accurate) at number recognition than us. But this paper shows how far behind they are still. In the context of cars I think the machines will just refuse to drive like we do. They (really their builders) will demand much better controlled conditions to operate safely.
This always seemed to me like a huge omission in reports about adversarial attacks, sure it can be fooled with pixel-perfect changes of input data, but would it survive literally any "real-world"-like environment? I am quite surprised it does!
Not quite the same problem but the result is pretty much the same. The fact that computer vision can be fooled by attacks like these are lower risk than we might imagine. The more important question is what is the likelihood that such conditions occur naturally and randomly.
Edit: also, the summary comment about this being the first time a physical object was used to fool a commercial classification system sounds... dubious...
1) people care much, much less about "hurting" automated systems, and
2) people feel much less responsibility for accidents & failures if they are separated by a level of indirection of automation
3) people feel much less responsible for mass actions that affect anonymous people far away
Together, those three factors will indeed cause more incidents of people attempting to fool the self-driving cars. Especially if done by displaying malicious images via mass devices, like the light-up info boards, electronic billboards etc.. I don't expect much more actual accidents, tho.
What exactly is the utility?
Your line of thinking is really good. A well-crafted attack is hard to execute and little things can very well ruin an attack sequence. A subtle the difference between academic research and the real world.
[1] As this study found adversarial images that affect a number of different implementations, there is some implementation-independence, which may be helpful in solving the problem.
On the other hand a different sign is just a different sign.