Sure, say you configure a Linux, OpenBSD, and FreeBSD machine to provide some useful service. A "stack" as they call it these days. None of these OSes are going to have a large attack surface outside that "stack", and that is the primary liability in running an internet service. There are relatively rare occurrences like the TCP SACK bug that affected Linux and Netflix' non-default FreeBSD RACK TCP stack. Every UNIX-like written in C without formal verification is subject to incidents like that from time to time. Every other security concern is addressed in an OS-agnostic fashion with failure domains, limits of scope/networking, access controls, monitoring, and operations procedures.
Now what Linux, and to a lesser degree FreeBSD, can do is survive real world usage at scale. OpenBSD cannot. It would fall over or require magnitude more machine count to do the same workloads that people use Linux and FreeBSD to run. So all the exploit mitigation diatribe and "great defaults" and pet projects are cute but funny when you try and throw shade onto others with them. As I said, there are some kernels of truth that pertain less about security and more about overall health in FreeBSD this doc accidentally hits on, but running some hobby software like opensmtpd on openbsd isn't going to save the world from real cybersecurity issues.