Which is a big problem with PGP. All the ceremony repels normal users, makes the system far harder to use, but also tightly binds enthusiasts to its subculture, making it that much harder to improve.
Which is a big problem with PGP. All the ceremony repels normal users, makes the system far harder to use, but also tightly binds enthusiasts to its subculture, making it that much harder to improve.
What should I use if want to send dead simple, foolproof encrypted email? (Foolproof in that I can trust that updating the program will patch vulnerabilities and incorporate the state of the art methods)
Signal is the best of the lot, but Wire, or anything else that uses Signal Protocol is fine.
This is a big no. Even Wire uses metadata but only requires an e-mail account. I would like to see Ricochet (https://ricochet.im/) picked up by someone. Tor hidden services have been improved with added features which Ricochet does not utilize. I skimmed through the codebase and I came across some issues, heck, even the design is a bit obsolete as we have better algorithms with better parameters. Regardless, the idea is great and this is definitely doable, even by modifying Ricochet's codebase.
There is Cwtch (https://cwtch.im/) that extends Ricochet to support multi-party messaging. I did not dig deep into it, but it may use the same algorithms. Additionally, it uses a language with a GC.
I think a Ricochet-like IM software written in Ada/SPARK using libsparkcrypto (https://github.com/Componolit/libsparkcrypto) would be ideal.
Exactly and what's to say I want some random guy on the internet being able to call my phone.
Keep in mind tptacek quite literally pastes replies gushing about Signal/Wire in any thread related to PGP or instant messaging. They even paste it in threads which mention PGP but talk about other issues such as file encryption, signing etc, ie the uses not covered by an instant messaging platform. I have come to just skimming over anything they say because of it. Come on, put a bit of effort into your reply.
> Wire uses metadata but only requires an e-mail account.
It also doesn't offer federation. At this point I think Matrix is the best hope if you're okay with minimal metadata. It is also making huge strides of progress if you keep up to date with their development, so that's exciting. https://matrix.org/blog/posts
> There is Cwtch (https://cwtch.im/) that extends Ricochet to support multi-party messaging. I did not dig deep into it, but it may use the same algorithms. Additionally, it uses a language with a GC.
I have high hopes for Cwtch. It seems to be a common thing people don't want to address: metadata. That said you can have a fairly meta-dataless experience with Matrix if you run a server and don't federate.
Ideally I'd like to see this get solved https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/2320#issuecomme...
Can you find a concrete example of that?
I should have been more clear on that. Their own replies, look at their post history.
It's usually something like "Use Signal/Wire blah blah they are so good and will solve all the worlds problems". Someone then always points out that Signal requires you to share your phone number. Who wants to do that publicly?
Then people usually say the desktop client is pretty bad experience and you need Signal on your phone anyway to be able to use it. Even if you use a disposable SIM, the issue comes up with the number going back into the carrier distribution pool to be issued to new customers.
Phone numbers are a terrible way to identify people. Unlike email, where you can have spam filters, phone numbers have virtually no user controls for stopping unsolicited communications. Hell even IRC has that it's called /ignore.
Often then the next thing that gets mentioned is Signal does not like people making third party clients, so that means no nice TUI client or something that is native for your platform. I dunno about you, but I go out of my way to avoid Electron. I am thankful that at least with Matrix, there are other clients being developed, and tools like Pantalaimon that will allow for easy encryption everywhere. https://github.com/matrix-org/pantalaimon
I have blind friends and they say Electron applications are terrible. By that I mean non-functional with their screen readers, so that's a 0/10 for accessibility.
And then someone else always points out Wire has metadata and isn't even federated like Matrix so you're back to square one.
But it's not that or something like it. Nor is it "literally pastes replies". You can take issue with both the opinions and the way they're presented. You can't mis-represent them, though, and that's what you're doing.
Okay I did check, and point taken on the literally part.
But I do still stand by many of his replies start with:
"Use Signal/Wire......"
He's got his opinions and he states them pretty clearly. I don't think that's a crime. I've discussed his opinions with him in threads before and I can't see anywhere where he's obviously wrong. When I've asked him directly about the identifiers, he's declined to answer -- which makes me think that he probably agrees but thinks that the other issues are more important than that. I could be wrong, but that's my impression.
You don't have to, it's easy to pull the plentiful relevant hadith:
https://hn.algolia.com/?query=author:tptacek%20signal%20phon...
Where it runs into problem is with authentication and protecting users from third parties collecting information about which people are exchanging information with each other. Signal makes the assumption that you don't mind that the person you are communicating with knows who you are. This makes it unacceptable for certain dissidents. The key you use to identify yourself allows the government (or almost anyone, really) to find out your name and your address.
All people in a conversation know who all the people participating in the conversation are. So even if the target of your conversation doesn't mind being identified, you may have third parties who make introductions. Those third parties must be identified with Signal. This allows a potential attacker to build up profiles of who is associating with whom.
At one point Moxie was discussing the idea of a protocol which would allow parties to introduce one another without having to reveal their identities. As far as I know this hasn't been implemented yet (but I haven't been keeping track of development). Additionally, as far as I can tell, Signal can potentially know which people are talking to which other people. Now, in the source code for their server, it doesn't, but there is actually no way to know that they are really using that source code in production unmodified. The lack of federation means that there is no way to mitigate this risk (To be fair, I completely understand their point on federation, but again I find it disingenuous that all discussion of federation is thrown out of the window as being too difficult to implement -- without any acknowledgement that we still have a problem that we need to address!)
I don't think any of these issues are in dispute. The answer is simply: Signal does not intend to solve these problems. Their goal is to provide end to end encryption in the context of how you would use SMS. If that doesn't fit your purposes, then Signal will not work for you.
I honestly feel that people are being a bit disingenuous. There are plenty of situations where email is a great medium for exchanging information. To say that "Email can not be secured" and that you should go to a messaging format is not exactly telling the whole story. There are applications where email can be secured "enough". There are applications where SMS messaging can be secured "enough". There are applications where neither is good enough. And yet, the argument against email is taken to the nth degree (the fact that you can take the contents of an encrypted email and send it unencrypted is purportedly a serious security flaw, while the fact that I can take the contents of Signal message and do the same thing is apparently not).
However, like I said, I don't think tptacek is trying to be disingenuous. He honestly does like Signal and it honestly does improve security in the average case. He doesn't care that it doesn't do the things that it doesn't do because he thinks those things are less important. It's fair. He's an expert and certainly his opinions reasonably carry a lot of weight. You don't have to unthinkingly accept those opinions, though.
The one thing I would keep in mind is elevating a person's opinion because: "recognized security expert".
Their comments should be taken at face value and not given any extra special value because of "who they come from".
I purposely leave my background, education and employment out of my comments for that reason. I would not want my opinions to be judged more highly because of where I work.
> He doesn't care that it doesn't do the things that it doesn't do because he thinks those things are less important.
Just because he doesn't care doesn't make them any less of an issue.
On that note Matrix also offers a similar method with the phone number (it's optional to use a phone number) and if you do use it, the identity server can link you with other people that use it. https://matrix.org/docs/projects/other/sydent (that's also optional, you can run a matrix server without it).
Ideally the best usage would be to have two accounts, an account with your phone number you use with people that know you, (family, work etc) and one you use for random people on the internet that does not.
Signal laid a lot of the ground work with https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double_Ratchet_Algorithm hopefully now Matrix can take it to the next level (next generation), like email.
Their cross-signing stuff looks to be particularly interesting. https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/issues/4110
Additionally to these points, many countries require your ID (at the very least) to be associated to the SIM card you buy, plus phones are supposed to be assumed insecure/compromised as both their software and hardware is closed.
Recognized how, by whom?
> Yes, he likes Signal. Apparently like you, I disagree (their refusal to implement non-personally identifying information as an identity is enough for me).
No, what my point is, is that it isn't a solution to everything like he has purported repeatedly on here. PGP can be used over an slab of text, a file, or anonymously. That's where my main disagreement lies.
The other thing being, with signal is that it is fine if you want to give your phone number to people, but what if you don't? Then the whole platform cannot be used. You're communicating with me now, what if we wanted to continue this privately? would you want me having your phone number? I am just some guy on the internet. What If then you did give me your phone number, and I started calling you at 2am from a rented number in India? Would you have to change your phone number? You wouldn't be able to really use the law on me if I covered my tracks. Spam calls/SMS is already a issue.
Using disposable numbers isn't an option, because you don't know if there will be number reuse, someone else could be issued that number and then you might be talking to a different person. You don't own a phone number. There's a reason why when you delete your google account, nobody can signup with the same username.
Many countries now also store metadata, which means it would be trivial to determine your social graph, from data obtained from other sources. This means you'll never be able to get any kind of anonymous or pseudonymous communication with Signal.
That means it can only be used with specific communication use cases in mind.
Also it's a centralized platform with a single point of failure, that is very hostile to anyone making their own client that might provide a better experience than the official one. When you consider that point it's not much better than the other options out there that are widely in use.
People have visceral reactions to particular secure messengers. I really don't care. Use whichever one. Just don't pretend email is secure. I don't like Wire, but I'll recommend it if it means people will stop pretending that PGP is protecting them.
I am not sure what made you believe that I pretended e-mail is secure. I said Wire requires an e-mail address (to use), while Signal requires a phone number. No way I was ever trying to imply that e-mail is secure, because it is certainly not.
I think that you'll find that among the "secure" messengers, all of the reasonable ones use a variant of Signal's constructions --- which is why Moxie and Trevor won the Levchin RWC prize for it --- boiling down to the "Axolotl" double ratchet over curves and AEAD ciphers. I endorse Signal, but when I say "secure messengers that use the Signal protocol", it's that broader cryptographic blueprint to which I refer, not the particular application.
It's likely that within the next few years we'll have other reasonable blueprints from which to work; Facebook's cryptographers are hard at work on Message Layer Security, which is a group messaging construction quite different from Signal Protocol, but, again, purpose-built for messaging. For now, though, all the reasonable choices use Signal's underlying design.