("Pennywise the Dancing Clown" is usually defined as "the clown from It". I'm repurposing the name for the sake of this argument. We need a name for "scariest possible clown"; I'm choosing "Pennywise".)
Premise 2: real things are scarier than imaginary things.
We can imagine Pennywise The Dancing Clown (he exists in understanding---you're welcome). A real Pennywise is scarier than an imaginary Pennywise (2).
Then, if Pennywise The Dancing Clown does not exist, we can conceive a scarier clown (a real Pennywise). This leads to a contradiction with respect to (1). Therefore by proof of contradiction, Pennywise the Dancing Clown must exist.
Where's the flaw in this argument? Does the same flaw apply in the theological argument?