Well, physical locks are not necessary harder to pick lock than electronic locks. Buy your self a pick lock set, practice a bit and be amazed how many locks you can pick.
Well, physical locks are not necessary harder to pick lock than electronic locks. Buy your self a pick lock set, practice a bit and be amazed how many locks you can pick.
Any monkey can buy lock picks and pick a door lock. It's not hard. Generally if you buy a decent rake, it'll open most locks quickly. It's arguably much more work to hack the _smart_ side of a lock than it is to just pick the _dumb_ part.
The caveat here is that smart locks are often "picked" en masse - once you break one in a lab, you can immediately and silently do the same to the rest globally. This is similar to software hacking.
The guidance here should be to only purchase smart locks from vendors that you can trust to patch zero-days quickly. How you qualify a vendor as such is a mystery - I don't know that there's been enough zero days on smart locks to verify.
Most B&E’s aren’t exactly executed by master thieves they aren’t single pin picking your locks.
When selecting a door lock or a pad lock you should care only that it can be raked or bypassed, for bike locks you should also care that it can’t be easily cut.
For the most part your door is likely going to be the weakest link as most people don’t have reinforced doors and door frames.
I've been burgled 4 times in my life, all 4 were either jimmied window or jimmied door (usually a screwdriver as a prying tool).
There's a difference between using a lock that requires an expert to pick, vs a smart lock that requires an expert to write an app that anyone can use to hack the lock.
LPL's real good videos are his physical attacks. Whether it's twisting, core pulling, or breaking out the Ramset, all are more likely than a criminal trying to SPP a lock.
I get why people are hard on smart locks, but I really don't see them as any more insecure then regular locks.
If there's a fire or medical emergency (heart attack, allergic reaction/anaphylactic shock etc) - you generally don't want it to be too hard to break in...
For example, here[1] is a "keyless bluetooth padlock" that can be opened trivially by rapping the locking pall with any hammar-like tool ("rock"). (it also has far too much around the shackle, so can also be opened with a a simple shim (e.g. a small cutout from a cola can). Another common problem are locks that don't seal their electronics securely, so they can be attacked by simply unscrewing a panel, ripping out the electronics. and touching the battery wires to the locking pal's actuator.
However, that type of problem are simply poor designs. In theory, in the future better designs could be made that include protections against well-known attack methods similar to what is already included in many "regular" locks.
A fundamental concern with locks that depend on radio (or worse, the internet) is what the lock does when when the radio/internet communication fails (for any reason). Does the lock fail-open, or fail-closed[2]? Did the lock even address this important question? Does the lock open if someone unplugs the router? Or does it trap people behind the lock if a fire destroys the cable/DSL modem? Physical locks also have failure-mode concerns, but they tend to be limited to something happening locally, With "smart" devices, you are adding remote resources (like the internet router in another room, or remote servers, etc) as a critical component of the lock's security. That is a terrible idea if you that remote resource is intrinsically outside your control.
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vIbXC5LR8aQ
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fail-safe#Fail_safe_and_fail_s...