The researcher can still disclose it, they just aren't going to get permission to disclose it on the Hackerone program. Most things out of scope don't get publicly disclosed as far as I know.
Doesn't seem too unreasonable.
Doesn't seem too unreasonable.
I'm really curious how much of what is reported to HackerOne ever gets and actual patch. It kind of seems like there are bunch of known vulnerabilities idling on their platform without quick fixes. Should be interesting once the HackerOne database is inevitably leaked.
HackerOne should start requiring companies pay researchers for duplicates - that the company already knew of a flaw should make them more liable, not less.
It seems weird that HackerOne put themselves in such a deeply loser position to try to be the ones to prevent submitters from revealing security issues. Why not be a neutral party, and let the companies try to enforce rules on the hackers in these cases?
That would create a perverse incentive for researchers to tell their friends about the vulnerability so that they can resubmit it and also get a bounty.
The problem could be solved on the side of the researchers by splitting the bounty among all submissions of the same bug, but anyone else with access to the report (employees of either HackerOne or the relevant company) could try to get a share by having someone create a duplicate report.
First come, first served seems like it would be the hardest to game, as the first reporter is guaranteed to have actually done the work (not counting rogue employees who create bugs to "find" and report).
There should probably still be some kind of reward for duplicate reports to avoid discouraging researchers, but something symbolic like publicly acknowledging that they found a bug might be enough to provide validation.
I assume it'd be hard to convince companies it may be in their better interest to set up an incentive structure this way. But perhaps a third party platform could find some such mutually beneficial equilibrium.
In reality, vendors (or at least, serious vendors) aren't gaming H1 to stiff bounty hunters. If anything, the major complaint vendors have about H1 is that they aren't paying enough --- that is, they deal with too many garbage reports for every report that actually merits a fix.
For external parties, yes. However it's the easiest to game for those liable, since you can just mark whatever you want as a "duplicate" and refuse to pay the bounty.
Offering bounties for public disclosures helps remove a lot of perverse incentives.
It was pretty low hanging fruit. I was going through an XSS tutorial and used their site for practice. `<script>alert(1)` could be saved into several user fields including Name and would then be executed on every subsequent pageload around the site.
If there was some indication that someone had reported it recently I maybe would have waited longer, but I suspect this bug had been known for months.
> The patch was almost immediately proved to be insufficient, and another security researcher found an easy way to go around it almost right away.
You might want to read the article.
Isn't security through obscurity largely to be avoided? I thought the working model for most security researchers was: if it's not worth fixing, it's not worth hiding.
More to the point, I thought that responsible disclosure always came with an expectation of public disclosure. The advice I've always been given is that you should never disclose with conditions -- ie. "fix this and I won't tell anyone."
It should always be, "I am going to tell everyone, but I'm telling you first so you can push a fix before I do."
Does HackerOne operate under different rules?