A report on Chinese digital surveillance and hacking of Uyghurs
volexity.com
volexity.com
The exploit itself is 22,963 bytes of code and if successful will ultimately result in the forced download of a file name loader to the /data/data/com.android.browser directory of the victim device
How can a website force download a file to a device? Seems like a browser vulnerabilityBut for instance all images, many pages, etc are locally stored/cached by the browser.
Volexity has identified similarities to but has not yet verified that the exploit being employed in this attack is the Chrome Turbofan remote code execution vulnerability that was reported via the SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure program and is covered in an advisory here: https://ssd-disclosure.com/archives/3379/ssd-advisory-chrome...
> The exploit itself is 22,963 bytes of code and if successful will ultimately result in the forced download of a file name loader to the /data/data/com.android.browser directory of the victim device
The way you quoted is unreadable on mobile, and difficult to read on desktop (scrolling). It is meant for max 80 chars blocks of programming text.
So either that Xinjiang province is not behind the great firewall, or that Xinjiang has far greater internet freedom than the rest of China, so which one is which? You can't really have both in this case.
If you're targeting activists inside of China you have to expect they'll use those VPNs. You also expect them to specifically choose non-chinese mail/communication mediums in order to not be identified by the PRC.
This report is newsworthy because it says that making these choices might not protect you anymore.
China is targeting Uighurs that have moved out of China: the "Uighur diaspora".
When you smell bullshit, always double check your assumptions, sometimes the smell is coming from nearer than you might think!
> However, as the sites listed in this post are actually blocked in China, it can be seen that the Uyghur diaspora around the world are also primary targets of these digital surveillance operations. These operations can be used to track the movements of Uyghurs outside of China and spy on those they are communicating with.