- Airbus started later, so they started with newer technology, on top of it the fly-by-wire / all electronics commands. Boeing is weighted by its legacy. Dozens of thousands of pilots have been trained on mechanical systems, it’s hard to migrate them. Airbus benefited from watching Boeing’s experience and starting at the age of electronics.
- Boeing bought McDonnell Douglas in the 2000’s which has extremely bad engineering records (Half of episodes of Air Crash Investigation are about the DC-9/DC-10/MD-11, involving FAA leniency on the flying doors, FAA leniency on extending the length without doing the proper engineering, and I don’t know if one sees a ressemblance with current events). So the MD acquisition may have entirely modified Boeing’s middle management approach to « handling FAA ». By negotiating FAA’s leniency, or by having people exchange jobs and offices...
- Since the MD purchase 20 years ago, Boeing has chosen to collude with FAA to become the certifier instead of the FAA, in order to win competition against Airbus. Unfortunately it has eroded customer trust when we noticed the FAA isn’t doing its job at all, for example about the metal frames where workers had to drill extra holes next to misplaced ones, or bend the frames, compromising structural integrity entirely [1], the batteries or the MCAS.
- Now with 200 aircrafts 737 Max grounded since 6 months, and perhaps in need of being thrown away entirely, although Boeing isn’t paying directly, it’s still a very good solid stable reason on the long term for customers to choose... not them.
So Boeing had an incumbent, and played the card of « Let’s bypass the safety process and see whether we recover our advance ». It can’t bankrupt because it’s financially as engineered as a subprime, and a governmental strategic asset, but its future isn’t bright.