The current government requests to be able to access encrypted info with a warrent are an extension of what currently happens in physical space.
But, by having a special key that opens all the doors, anyone could copy it - yes rules can put in place to who as access, etc, etc, but by knowing there is a "hole" in each device, every possible malicious agent will try and break it as soon as possible. Then what?
We have seen examples by Law Enforcement officers using accesses to gather data that would required a court order, but they didn't have one, and it was for personal reasons. So, how does that work out?
I do not know that there is no one out there in the world who has a key to my house. Even if there was and someone found that key on a city street they would likely not be able to figure out which house it opened.
I know there is no legally mandated key to everyone's house that would allow anyone to enter whomever's house they please.
If an officer does something that should require a court order and don't have one then they end up prosecuted in the same way a criminal would be. You put checks and balances in place to make sure that they are caught.
You can't compare physical and digital privacy, why are people still trying it?
>But, by having a special key that opens all the doors, anyone could copy it - yes rules can put in place to who as access, etc, etc, but by knowing there is a "hole" in each device, every possible malicious agent will try and break it as soon as possible.
This is true in theory but it this a risk in practice?
>We have seen examples by Law Enforcement officers using accesses to gather data that would required a court order, but they didn't have one, and it was for personal reasons. So, how does that work out?
You sue for damages under section 1983.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard
TLDR: yes. Especially for companies and political dissidents (because countries, including the US, have used their secret and not-so-secret services to go after these. China vs Dalai Lama seems to be a rather well-known example, as is the theft of Airbus secrets by the NSA (not that the EU didn't do the same to Boeing). And if you can't trust the NSA with those keys, who exactly do you suggest we trust ?)
> You sue for damages under section 1983.
Ok, well let's keep in mind that this police officer was not convicted:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shooting_of_Michael_Brown
So unless you've got better cause for complaint than 12 bullets in your back and more than one witness, why even bother trying ?
I don't get where people get the idea that cops are somehow above ridiculous abuse of the system. When it comes to direct abuse of surveillance:
https://jezebel.com/cop-previously-charged-with-stalking-sho...
https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/prosecutors-cop-us...
Note the duration of time these police officers were allowed to proceed, even after complaints were filed. Years.
The problem with any system that consists of people, is that people can be total immoral and criminal. Including, of course, Law enforcement, even judges. That means that we should make such systems safe even if groups of people within them conspire to commit crimes. Failure to do so can result in incredible damage to people. For a very recent example:
https://www.thelocal.it/20190628/italian-police-uncover-gang...
TLDR: the major, police, social workers, youth services and psychiatrists conspired to kidnap children and sell them to brothels, sex shop owners, and whoever else paid them ... out of hundreds of children stolen in this way, 2 have been returned after these people got caught.
Of course it was subsequently revealed that there are multiple dozen municipalities where such conspiracies existed. The state immediately intervened to stop all investigations except the one that had already made the paper "la Republica".
There is not a single European country where members of youth services haven't been caught doing the same, from Romania, to Sweden, to France, to the Netherlands.
The key difference, to me, is that the current setup where the police can kick in the door to get in does not require subjects to make it any easier / more convenient for the police. If they have to raid and break in and get an approval, they will, but I am not required to arrange my locks or my furniture to help.
In fact, I am free to do the opposite. For example, I can put the things I do not want to share (private photos, detailed plans to become the world dictator, etc.), in an incinerator safe and try to destroy them if the doors are flying in. My 2c.
I'm opposed to back doors, but the door analogy is a bad one.
This is false. If it's ever true, the crime is confined to the perpetrator's mind.
Given this door analogy works for the majority of the arguments being presented (which is impressive in itself given how different the physical and electronic worlds are), I'd say it's actually a pretty good analogy.
The main difference where this analogy breaks down is that it is much easier to build practically unbreakable encryption (assuming P != NP), versus practically unbreakable doors or safes.
And surely we all deserve an underground bunker.
This is equally true for doors or encryption. If the government has a warrant for some data, they can attack the computing system that holds the data--just like trying to kick down a door.
They do this successfully all the time. Encryption is math in theory, but in practice it is implemented in hardware and software, neither of which are perfect. They are usually breakable.
The FBI made a big stink about forcing Apple to help them break the encryption on an iPhone. The FBI's own inspector general said that the FBI did not try hard enough to break into the phone before they went to court. And ultimately the FBI did break into that phone and access the data!
There is no need for a special law weakening encryption.
Some buildings are barricaded to make forced entry harder, some phones are more secure which makes hacking into them harder.
It just can't do so casually, with minimal resources, with a low probability of detection like it can when those messages are sent in the clear. A targeted cyberattack authorized by a warrant is the digital equivalent of sending a SWAT team to kick in a door.
And besides those not-so-abstract entities, they have contractors from private companies and corporations that aren't abstract neither, but even in abstract mode are driven by profit, not respecting your privacy/security/economy.