I'm OK with this as a starting point. If a jitter entropy system allow us to get pass this logjam, let's do it. At least for the x86 architecture, it will be security through obscurity. And if the alternative is potentially failing where the adversary can attack the CRNG, it's my preference. It's certainly better than nothing, in that in that very worst case, "security through obscurity" is better than "don't block, because blocking is always worse than an guessable value being returned through getrandom(0)". And so if these are the only two options, I'm certainly going to choose the former.
That being said, I'm still very worried that people with deep access to the implementation details of a CPU might be able to reverse engineer what a jitter entropy scheme produces. For that reason, I'd very much like to see someone do an analysis of how well these jitter schemes work on an open, simple architecture such as an RISC-V iplementation (you know, the ones that were so simplistic and didn't have any speculation so they weren't vulnerable to Specture/Meltdown). If jitter approaches turn out not to work that well on RISC-V, perhaps that will be a goad for future RISC-V chips to include the crypto extension to their ISA.
In the long term (not in time for the 5.4 merge window), I'm convinced that we should be trying as many ways of getting entropy as possible. If we're using UEFI, we should be trying to get it from UEFI's secure random number generator; if there is a TPM, we should be trying to get random numbers from the RPM, and mix them in, and so on.
After all, the reason why lived with getrandom(0) blocking for five years was because for the vast majority of x86 platforms, it simply wasn't problem in practice. We need to get back to that place where in practice, we've harvested as much uncertainty from hardware as possible, so most folks are comfortable that attacking the CRNG is no longer the simplest way to crack system security.
(The above is a lightly edited almagamation of https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190930033706.GD4994@mit.edu and https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190930131639.GF4994@mit.edu)