But what is achievable immediately is being closer to user's expectations of what will be pasted in general, and a step-by-step approach gives benefits in this regard at every step, without making false promises.
But what is achievable immediately is being closer to user's expectations of what will be pasted in general, and a step-by-step approach gives benefits in this regard at every step, without making false promises.
What happens?
Do we not let Google modify what you just copied to inject the actual rich-text version of what you highlighted, as opposed to the presentation-formatted version you're seeing as a user in the editor UI?
What can actually be done if we allow the 'good actors' to continue working as needed?
Except I don't think we should ask the user, because everyone will blindly click yes. I think we should disable this by default, and let Google Docs, etc., remind the user via some in-app modal with step-by-step instructions.
If someone actually needs this functionality, let them do the work to unlock it for a given website.
99.99999% of the web has no good reason to be modifying a user's clipboard.
> The metro.co.uk code inserts an off-screen-positioned element with the disclaimer into the selection range, and you could just listen for selectionchange and/or mouse drag and/or keypress events to detect selection changes, and add/remove such an element based on those events.
Well, shit.
Never underestimate newspaper publishers' CMS vendors' ingenuity.
What's clear to me is that the situation we have now is suboptimal, that coming up with a better solution will take up some time, and that incrementally fixing the current situaton completely will take enough time to find a better solution in the meantime.
could you not have a two tiered clipboard that is exposed via javascript for the webpage interactions(to solve the copy and paste issue with rich text inside google docs) but have the main paste system be synced with the system clipboard and that restricts the copy and paste to visible text/non-javascript hijackable(stops the manipulation of the clipboard to inject malicious code for terminals or even the annoying injection of "this snippet was copied from example.com/xyz")
I haven't thought too hard about the downsides to this or how hard it would be to implement but i'd be curious to see any discussion on some kind of approach like this.