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The attacker needs to generate a new cert that the client trusts. This is easy on a corporate network where you can force users to trust a private CA. Unlikely to happen with a US ISP, but possible if someone hacks the CA (eg DigiNotar) or the CA hands out unconstrained certificates to someone who acts badly (eg CNNIC).

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Speaking of which, is there a published list of Root CA fingerprints a specific version of OS or browser is supposed to have that I can compare to? In other words, how can one tell if their browser/OS is not compromised with undesirable Root CAs.

Mozilla and Microsoft publish their lists. Chrome uses the OS's root store. I've seen other open source software use Mozilla's list, but I've never seen a list of what software does that.

https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Included_Certificates https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security/trusted-root/parti...

What you are describing doesn't seem to be a MITM attack on https traffic, but something else, which is why I stated "sans CA cert".

They're describing what would be required to MITM HTTPS traffic. You're correct that they essentially need to get the cert.

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