the default should be that if the flight handling characteristics of the airframe itself inherently are not the same then it doesn't get type certification, and you should have to prove why your tweaks make it OK.
> A type certificate signifies the airworthiness of a particular category of aircraft, according to its manufacturing design (‘type’). It confirms that the aircraft is manufactured according to an approved design, and that the design ensures compliance with airworthiness requirements.
And to be clear, since it seems my comment was also not totally clear: I'm not saying aircraft regulation / Type Certification is bad in general. Just that this particular implementation currently has unintended perverse incentives which lead to the 737 MAX.
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/new-q...
Also, the FAA were the last aviation regulator to ground the MAX.
They're so good at their jobs, you should be asking what they know that you don't when they make decisions, not trying to correct them.
That no longer seems to be the case (given the fact that EASA now want to have their pilots fly the MAX before it returns to service), and there's well documented evidence (many news articles over the past few months talk about this) showing that over the past 10 years, the FAA's budget was drastically cut, forcing them to effectively outsource certification in part to Boeing to "self-certify".
The FAA was actually one of the last regulators in the world to ground the 737-MAX [1].
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_MAX_groundings#Regu...
I wouldn't call this a perverse or unexpected incentive either. It's very straightforward: there is regulation saying you can't keep the same type certificate if the plane flies differently enough to demand pilot retraining. The regulation is good and the consequences of following the regulation correctly are good, unlike in actual perverse incentive situations.
Boeing didn't want to comply with the regulation so they lied about how the plane worked and then hundreds of people died.
That's not an example of a perverse incentive of regulation: it's an example of dishonestly evading regulation, hopefully criminally so.
Eh. The relationship here is between the manufacturer and the FAA. That the regulation is tangentially related to pilots is moot to the point.
> It's very straightforward: there is regulation saying you can't keep the same type certificate if the plane flies differently enough to demand pilot retraining. The regulation is good
I agree!
> and the consequences of following the regulation correctly are good
Mostly true!
> Boeing didn't want to comply with the regulation
This was (arguably) an outcome, but I don't believe it was the goal. I.e., Boeing would love to comply with this regulation in the magical hypothetical where it cost them nothing to do so. They're not comical villains.
The problem with this simplistic summary you've provided is that qualifying a new type certificate is extremely costly. Convincing the FAA your new aircraft is actually just a modified version of an existing type certificate (whether or not that is true) is much less costly (and given how much of the 1960s airframe is still being used in the MAX to keep that type certificate, it's even plausibly reasonable to consider it like earlier extensions to the cert).
So, long story short, there is a direct financial motivation for Boeing to skirt the rules and pretend new products are just another modified 737. That is exactly the perverse incentive I am highlighting.
> That's not an example of a perverse incentive of regulation: it's an example of dishonestly evading regulation, hopefully criminally so.
I think you mostly missed the point. Regulations with mostly good consequences can still create perverse incentives in some areas and positive incentives in others.
Yes but you're missing that there are two sets of costs: the recertification cost for Boeing, and the retraining costs for their customers, the airlines. Boeing didn't want to pay and it didn't want to tell its customers that there was this additional cost and risk losing some sales.