Use something like Perspectives instead of CAs:
http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/security/perspectives-bette...
We need SSL certificates for encryption. With the certificate you get a private key that is used for secure communication between your browser and HN (both ways).
If it didn't cause every browser to show a big, scary, your-computer-will-instantly-explode-and-your-children's-social-security-numbers-will-be-stolen-if-you-continue, using self-signed certificates (ie. certificates that anyone can just generate) wouldn't be that big of a deal. It could open you up to a man-in-the-middle attack, but it's still way better than sending everything in the clear.
How do you know that? That's the whole point of SSL - knowing that you've traded private keys with the right party.
SSL for "encryption only" only works to defend against attackers that can listen to your network, but cannot write to it. So, sure, it defends against some passive collection system, and perhaps against some tools that are designed to just listen.
But, if browsers stopped displaying warnings, so that using a "bad" certificate worked just fine, then I'd bet the tools would just switch to allow cert injection and we'd all be worse off.
(Hint: https should have been implemented the same way. CAs are fundamentally broken.)
That's the way it's supposed to work. You know the first time you logon to a server and it asks if you trust it? You're supposed to call up the server admin and get them to read off the fingerprint, or have them email it to you, or get it from some other out-of-band channel.
And no-one, nowhere actually verifies host fingerprints. Even security conscious people. And what do people do when they get that warning about a modified fingerprint? Just delete the entry from authorized_hosts and re-connect.
So ssh actually does a really shitty job handling key exchange.
Anyway, the closest thing to a real alternative to https and CAs is monkeysphere (OpenPGP WoT for servers), but no-one uses that.
While 'security conscious people' might not verify the fingerprint out-of-band when adding it the first time, I'm sure most of them wouldn't just remove the authorized_hosts entry...
That doesn't make any sense to me. There are even free services that can perform the validation for you based on a "crowdsourced" approach to verification, like Perspectives:
http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/security/perspectives-provi...
She was apparently someone who should have known better, but instead was willing to believe that FireFox was just warning her spuriously about valid HTTPS certs -- yes, someone had hacked her computer, and was collecting every bank, credit card, and online shopping password as she fell for an MITM attack over and over.
In this case, though, we don't need a CA. PG could publish the key in an essay and we'd just carry it through manually.