Soon after the industry seriously stops doing this, the fancy name schools will quickly get female-dominated, and whatever the industry starts using as a signal of candidate quality that hadn't been male-dominated before, will start to be.
When proposing new policies, always solve for equilibrium, don't ignore second order effects, and never assume the world is steady state system.
Why would this happen? Is your thinking that men will respond to the lower incentive of a fancy school degree by pursuing other options, but women won't? If so, why?
Although, there is no clear reason why the new steady state would not be female dominant or evenly split, but if I were to take a bet, I would bet that the new scoring function will still hold existing bias because the problem starts much earlier.
By the way, this is called Campbell’s law.
I've thought along similar lines, but it was never clear to me if such a policy really performs "better" in real-world, politicized policy issues.
Do you know of any supporting examples?