Schneier does conclude his post with a general "weakening encryption does more harm than good", but the title still uses the term backdoor. No one who's learned a bit about crypto (omitting Lindsey Graham here https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/10/tech-companies-bipa...) is advocating for a "master key," short key lengths or backdoors that use obscurity to keep bad actors from exploiting them.
Key escrow is real & already deployed in things like FileVault's Institutional Recovery Key https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202385
All institutions don't use the same key and the vendor doesn't have to have a copy.
[Microsoft offers companies a recovery mechanism too https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/informatio...]
My guess to how key escrow weakens protections is through implementation mistakes. Are there also mathematical weaknesses that effectively shorten the key length making brute force more feasible??? Why is the discourse on the anti-lawful-intercept side so imprecise?