The rationale goes like this: After all this time, the best practical attacks on the _previous_ symmetric block cipher (DES) focus on the two things its designers intentionally picked to be weaker because they saw this as appropriate. The keys are too small (56-bits) and the blocks are too short (64-bits).
Cryptanalytically, there has been not insignificant progress on DES, but after decades of focus fire it's looking in relatively good shape. Some type of Linear cryptanalysis might get you down to 2^40 DES trials after you collect 2^47 plaintexts for example. That would be unacceptable in a brand new cipher (if you got this far thinking "Maybe I should use DES?" you are a bad Hacker and should feel bad), but still falls short of what you'd need to actually do bad things in the real world. We should not expect AES to suffer a quicker death. AES has 128-bit (or 256-bit) keys and a 128-bit block length so the obvious problems are fixed.
I don't have the same good feelings about the hashes or the asymmetric crypto yet.