Yes, I know. Where did I say anything about revealing? My comment was about 'running out', which is (IIRC) a limitation of some random number generators because of how they handle internal state. Now, that state may have many, many bits, but it is still finite. An analogy I've seen is like having a (paper) codebook.
Of course, if a system is compromised, and the attacker can read kernel memory, they can probably then recreate the stream--which is why (e.g.) OpenBSD stirred things up every so often.
Also, when you look at cache side channel attacks -- RC4 definitely publishes its internal state.
But the point is mood b.c. the stream cipher used switched from RC4 to ChaCha20 like 5 years ago. And there is no side channel attack on ChaCha20, yet.
Yes, everybody does that. But how many bytes you drop matters; over the years the recommendations have gone from 256 bytes to 512 bytes to 768 bytes to 1536 bytes to 3072 bytes as attacks have gotten better.