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Comment by FabHK | Hacker News Reader

> buying an aviation radio off the shelf and just chatting on the frequency or issuing fake clearances if you want to be a mass murderer

Incidentally, I am happily surprised that that never seems to happen. One could so easily create so much chaos at an airport... There is no authentication whatsoever.

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The problem with _requiring_ authentication is that it can create a safety issue when communications break down. As a pilot it's not a bad idea to carry a spare handheld radio, or even use a cel phone, when you lose communications.

I was flying once with a buddy of mine who was Pilot-In-Command and we lost (or thought we had lost) our radio on an IFR flight back into the Bay Area. What had happened was the Push-to-Talk button on the yoke had become stuck and we were transmitting the entire time while attempting to diagnose what was wrong. This happened for about five minutes. Thankfully he had a handheld radio in his flight bag, and when we turned it on we figured out really quickly what was going on.

In that scenario, if we didn't have the handheld radio, it would have caused a worse problem.

Pilots do train for communication failures. ATC at most airports has a number you can call to be patched through if your radio stops working and I've heard multiple cases of people having to use it.

In the worst case, there are non-verbal methods of communication that pilots or ATC can employ (ATC can send light signals, pilots rock their wings to signal communication failures, etc.)

Now I'm trying to remember if the radios have TX lights that would help show that you are transmitting...

G1000/G3000 radios do. TX and RX

G1000 will disable tx if you are transmitting for 35 seconds straight I think as a way to mitigate a stuck mic.

Yes, even many old school radios will have something that indicates transmitting or not.

Here's an example of a AA B757 in essentially that exact situation after taking off at JFK: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wcq6KipBOro

Seven six, on the fritz! (Squawk 7600.) There’s an established, cut—and-dry procedure for when an IFR aircraft goes NORDO. Even without that handheld, you would’ve been fine.

Every airplane between you and your destination, on the other hand, would find themselves being rerouted.

I didn't mean to imply that we thought we were in any kind of imminent danger. There were three pilots (including myself) in the plane, all whom had trained in a highly congested area.

My point was that having the handheld radio allowed us to trouble shoot the situation. Without the radio there would have been a lot higher workload and less of a margin for safety.

Plus you might've inadvertently blocked the frequency longer (for other participants) if you hadn't been able to diagnose it. So it was definitely a good thing you had the handheld aboard: even if there was no imminent danger for you, it would have been an inconvenience for many.

With all the instrumentation in a cockpit I'm surprised there isn't a simple light indicator that your radio is currently broadcasting.

Dumb question: how would a cellphone work given they don't work on passenger aircraft?

General aviation flies a lot lower and slower than passenger jets.

I've found that unless I'm under about 10000' and under about 150 knots, cell phones don't work very well in GA either.

Nice plane you have, if you fly above 10000' or above 150 knots frequently :-)

I've upgraded since, but my old 182 would do 10K any day and 150knots with a slight tailwind.

did it have the retractable gear? I've always loved that design.

No, mine was a straight 182. I agree that the 182RG is a great airplane.

I've accidentally had phones on during takeoff and they lost signal within seconds. Were they already going too fast? Or was there jamming?

Doppler shift for the signal?

Yes. Speed

I've managed to keep a data connection pretty far into the initial ascent. It was surprising!

Moving too fast for the cell network to keep up, I'm guessing. Before it manages to handoff to the next cell, you're actually leaving that one already.

I'm kind of wondering if there even needs to be. If you keyed up on frequency near a major airport as described in the GP, I'm pretty sure the FAA and FCC would be working together to track you down in short order. I could see the argument that it would be good to add authentication to the radios to complement the strict enforcement for a sort of belt-and-suspenders approach. However, I think a more pressing concern for aviation radio is that is is kept simpler, and thus with fewer failure modes, and thus more reliable Because when you need that radio in an emergency, that has to be the worst possible time to have to deal with authentication hiccups.

Could they? A moving target? Say the soundproofed back of some van.

I personally would volunteer to be on one of the teams in another van with directional antennas to triangulate your transmissions and shut down you ASAP.

The fact that no one has ever truly tried that sort of poisoning of radio calls is more due to the tower and aircraft having a very well defined set of calls, so that the likelihood of false transmissions being able to cause havoc is minimized already.

I agree with another commenter that aviation radio systems should be the simplest, most reliable systems possible, and have that layer of communication depend on proper radio call discipline and no more.

My question was of theoretical nature, i'm not up to mischief of that sort. Though i'm often thinking about the vulnerabilities of our technological society, and the (false) assumptions we have about that. Compare it with lock picking. Most are easily bumped, or not even bothering with that, the door kicked down, some window used instead, and so on. Now, when someone kicks your door down, that's getting noticed, sooner or later.

But what about cheap SBCs dropped somewhere with a battery and some custom periphery working as a relay? Of course the SUVs could find that. After the fact.

Pulling these kinds of attacks - especially undetected - requires a certain level of intellect and education that should also be unaffected by things like substance abuse that hamper systematic planning. People with that level of capability almost always manage to create sufficiently comfortable life situations for themselves that they they lack motivation to do so.

Problems happen when either (1) technology to do harm becomes commoditized and freely available so less capable people can acquire and use (eg. Easy conversion of semi automatic to automatics, commoditized hacks for script kiddies) or (2) capable people feel they're been sufficiently wronged that they don't care about the consequences of revenge (pretty much all the really big headline terrorist actions)

Most intelligence activity on prevention focuses on (2) since pulling off such actions generally requires the capable planners to coordinate with less capable "feet on the ground" who can give things away. However capable people acting alone which happens occasionally is pretty much impossible to stop (Timothy McVeigh, Ted Kazynski, Kaloyev)

VHF radios are relatively easy to locate by direction finding techniques, using for example a doppler direction finding array. The FCC's enforcement division is well-known to possess SUVs with this kind of equipment discreetly installed, although due to their famously limited budget you aren't too likely to see one in the wild. On the other hand, though, many large airports have such equipment permanently installed (e.g. RFEye).

It happens sometimes [1]

It actually happened near me once when a local crazy guy got mad that planes were flying near his house (he bought a house right across the street from the municipal airport) so he found an airband radio and started yelling at them every time they came too close for his liking.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZvA_-linhg8

Wiarton is pretty far from Toronto. But I dunno how many receiving/sending antennae they have for « Toronto Centre ».

Toronto Centre is in the top level of the ATC hierarchy and is a geographic area rather than specific to the city of Toronto. Airband AM only has a range of 50-200mi in flight so they have outlying stations, usually colocated with VOR stations IIRC.

He probably got lucky and had a station within 5-10 miles of his bathtub...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toronto_Area_Control_Centre

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/oceania/aust...

It happens rarely, but pilots are also trained to not blindly follow clearances. They are still pilot in command.

But the risks and consequences are catastrophic. The Feds will put you away forever for even attempting it.

While true, you'd think state sponsored terrorism wouldn't care about sacrificing a few people.

What kind of state sponsored terrorism? Black ops programs? Air forces dropping bombs? Assassinations and decapitation strikes?

Or are we talking about the boogieman that is an excuse for all sorts of paranoid crackdowns, expenditures, and questionable legislature?

Who exactly are you afraid will sponsor radio jammers at airports, and why do you think they will do so?

actually, I'd think state sponsored terrorism would have the resources to get away with it.

Just send the voice data through a raspberry pi to a remote location and carry out the attack from there. You could send voice data through a TOR-like protocol or something to keep you anonymous, if that's important. You could maybe rig some explosives to go off if the FBI/FCC/FAA gain access to the attack point, to prevent them from recovering evidence.

Lot's of police/fire radio systems are similarly without authentication, so you could amplify the mayhem by doing the same thing to those frequencies.

With state sponsored terrorism, the risk isn't that the Feds will put the agent away forever, it's that the USG (and, incidentally, other particularly allowed countries) will identify that it is state sponsored terrorism and treat the attack as exactly what it is—simultaneously and act of war and a gross violation of the laws of war.

And most major airports have systems like RFEye or AIRPORT-SHIELD. You would be _immediately_ pinpointed with a remarkable level of accuracy from 3-6 sensors.

Especially near major metro areas, unintentional interference is a daily issue. These systems immediately triangulate sources of interference in a wide band. Or you have simpler systems like UMS100 that just do alerting and you send out an engineer with a wand to walk around for a bit to triangulate it.

These could be pretty easily defeated through a multitude of tactics. They're just being pitched as a stop gap solution against the low hanging fruit like morons with drones or a drunk person with an airband handheld.

Imagine an unlicensed drone emitting GPS radio signals. Just a small amount of sophistication and an attacker can do an incredible amount of harm.

If you live in Florida, you can go down to the pawn shop, buy a gun, drive over to the airport and start shooting at planes. Doesn't take much sophistication to cause a lot of harm.

At a plane. Then you get a SWAT response and terrorism charges - consequences are also a reason this doesn't happen on a mass scale.

With an omnidirectional antenna, sure. With a high-gain antenna, no. The attacker could entirely avoid the RFEye or AIRPORT-SHIELD. The attacker could pick a specific aircraft to pester, with no other aircraft able to listen.

Add some fancy voice synthesis, and it gets interesting. The attacker could clone the voice and style of the air traffic controller. The attacker could provide enough power to quiet out any other transmissions. To keep the air traffic controller incompletely aware, the attacker could provide interference (just to the tower) whenever the victim aircraft begins to transmit.

> Incidentally, I am happily surprised that that never seems to happen. One could so easily create so much chaos at an airport... There is no authentication whatsoever.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airband

One of the reasons why airband radio uses amplitude modulation is so that a much more powerful transmitter (ground based, operated by air traffic control or tower personnel, with access to very high Tx powers), can transmit on top of spurious transmissions coming from low powered aircraft or handheld transmitters. The big ground based Tx can step on an interloper and communicate its message to all aircraft on the same frequency.

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