Reusing the precise collision from the shattered attack is made impossible by initializing the state with anything other than the prefix from the shattered attack. But the cost for mounting such an attack yourself is only 11k USD. However, as git uses the sha1collisiondetection library, such an attack would be detected by current git. Thus, this library is a much better protection than the length encoding.
> this new version would have to contain the desired hostile code, still function as a working floppy driver, and not look like an obfuscated C code contest entry
It's still plausible that one can pull a trick like that to introduce malicious code into the repo, but improbable.
> An attacker would not just have to do that, though; this new version would have to contain the desired hostile code, still function as a working floppy driver, and not look like an obfuscated C code contest entry
The whole idea is that they want to switch away before these things become likely. They are unlikely now, but SHA-1 is only getting weaker as time goes by and more research is done.
The full quote here is even better:
"and not look like an obfuscated C code contest entry (at least not more than it already does)."