This seems fairly reasonable. One of the criticisms of the Max situation is that the FAA went along with Boeing's plan that only additional minimal training was required. Reviewing those standards seems like a good idea.
We'll see.
How the FAA works is they come up with a NPRM (Notice of Proposed Rule Making) document, circulate it, and receive feedback.
Likely the airline industry will reply with a push back on the 1,500 rule since they're doomed financially if it continues (US airlines NEVER pay for ab initio pilot training, unlike Europe and Asia.)
As long as Congress is not involved in more regulatory fiascos like the 1,500 hour rule, I'm good.
Few people are accepting the fact that Boeing's sweetheart relationship with FAA is a result of the fact they are largely one of the fee only players in the game.
There's no competitive pressure for Boeing to change behaviour iwth the politicians and regulators in their pocket they have little to fear by going forward with business ss usual.
The fact they are managing to push Boeing to adopt more stringent training is good. I just hope it doesn't just add to the long list of things excluding any entrepreneur from honestly competing with him (just look at Virgin Airlines which was one of the most enjoyable flight experiences getting squeezed out).
Every major regulation in history has had unintended side-effects which frequently offset the benefits of the original plan (because of course they were designed for the entrenched mega-coprp interests of today with little thought of the wider long term effects on the industry).
Thomas Sowell wrote two good books which highlight a hundred examples how these well-intentioned regulations have contributed to the wealth inequality and consumer monopolies both [1] and Basic Economics [2].
Its not a simple as anti-regulation or pro-regulation, but getting the right kind of regulation based on data and with foresight into the unintended implications.
[1] https://www.amazon.com/Wealth-Poverty-Politics-Thomas-Sowell...
[2] https://www.amazon.com/Basic-Economics-Fifth-Common-Economy/...
The public misunderstands the role between FAA and Boeing.
Boeing is the ODM, so safety is largely delegated to Boeing. That is necessary because the FAA does not have aircraft designers on staff, and won't, because aerospace keeps advancing.
What is needed is criminal penalties for what Boeing did regarding the inaccurate MCAS FAA filings.
Congressional representatives have at times pursued fraud charges against pilots for various reasons. The problem is that if they do that against campaign donors, then those briefcases of cash will disappear.
https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=93206
To offer something constructive:
1) In American corporate mgmt., discussion and accountability is diffused across multiple teams. Even attempting to use the word accountability is perceived as "a problem."
2) That's compounded when you have complex systems that use both hardware and software. In the case of the 737 MAX, you have external sensors subject to weather and damage, internal wiring and software. In this case it appears the software was outsourced. It would take their best Sr. Engineers to trace through that and say anything definitive. See #1 for why it's not worth it as an employee.
3) Submitting FAA aerospace compliance documents and outsourcing software development may simply be incompatible due to change management iterations and accountability.
So my summary would be that Boeing needs to be re-organized around accountability instead of penny-pinching. That would require turning a huge company inside-out. None of the founders are left. The current CEO has that mandate, but seeing is believing.
I don't understand this part. Could aerospace engineers working at the FAA not learn about advances?
If you're an American aerospace engineer, working for the FAA and specialising in airliners - where is your next job likely to be?
There is no reason for them to exist if they have to pay competitive salaries.
It's actually even worse than that - "regional airlines" are merely contracts with straw men. The funding comes from the majors who control them like puppets. Get it now?
It's rare for mfgs. to set training requirements, as that's the FAA's perogative.
The only mfg. that I know has a training S-FAR is Robinson Helicopter for R-22 and R-44 models because of mast-bumping:
http://rhctraining.com/sfar-73/
Icon has pre-purchase contractual language requiring all kinds of things, including approved training:
https://www.iconaircraft.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/ICON...
The Robinson S-FAR was because of previous accidents, while for Icon it was due to the litigious nature of US society and the target audience being recreational owners.
Jets usually require a type rating or an FAA Letter of Authorization (LOA.) Same for gross weight over 12,500 pounds.
Fun fact 1: FAA examiners and designated pilot examiners usually watch flights from the ground for warbird LOAs and float plane ratings because those are so dangerous. If the applicant can survive a takeoff and landing in a taildragger with a 1,000 - 2,000 HP engine, that's pretty much all that matters. :)
Fun fact 2: Most pilot certification exams are done by Designated Pilot Examiners (DPEs) who are not FAA employees - they are independent contractors. FAA Examiners seldom do pilot rating exams except for CFI ratings, which I believe are free of charge.
DPEs can make good money as a weekend job - around $1,000/day for 2 exams. (When I did my commercial single, the DPE asked, "How about another rating today, like an add-on?") Ka-ching! :)
There was a weird FAA regulatory wrinkle around 2000 that DPEs were required to hold a current medical, even if the applicant was a rated pilot. (It affected one of the DPEs in Hawaii.) I heard that was changed, but I haven't seen anything in writing, and the FAA generally moves slowly.
The AOPA has a ton of detailed GA accident graphs for those who may be interested.