DigitalOcean, on the other hand, took a Sand Hill approach and is throwing money at becoming an AWS unicorn without realizing they are never going to be AWS. Read this carefully, DO: you will never, ever, ever be AWS. Full stop. You are not in the conversation, nor is Linode, nor is prgmr (but lsc knows that), nor is Vultr, and so on, and so on. Ask IBM about trying to take on AWS.
DigitalOcean is an incredible waste of capital and appears almost as if they didn’t bother to look at Linode’s story at all. The companies are nearly identical behind the scenes and are pursuing the exact same addressable market, but one is a VC darling intent on burning capital on a completely solved problem and therefore gets VC ecosystem attention and expands to fill that attention. Seriously, you can address this market with Excel and some Python scripts; I exaggerate, but not much. The amount of money DigitalOcean spends given my intimate familiarity with the problem space has been baffling to me for the last decade.
DigitalOcean should buy Linode with this debt so the Linode people can come in and fire the right people at DO and shed about seven hundred pounds of weight. When, not if, when DigitalOcean collapses, Linode will continue on and enjoy a sudden inflow of DO’s market share. Linode long predates DO and will postdate them, too.
I have a poor opinion of Linode in a lot of ways, by the way, so.
In the approach of "throwing money on the problem until it works" few can beat them. Alibaba's losses were surreal when they tried to get even to the tenth of AWS scale, but they went way further, and now they are profitable.
People can of course challenge their bookkeeping, but still...
If not for China they wouldn't be where they are and wouldn't have succeeded. Having a large core market you are the most competitive in (due to government regulations) provides a massive upside that you can then leverage in other markets.
I have receipts for my Linode employment and I am unconcerned about the veracity of my analysis (I’m actually paid for said analysis IRL). Think about that bar you’ve set for a minute: “this person doesn’t actively court a reputation on Hacker News, therefore the information is suspect.” If that sounds good to you, we are unlikely to agree on anything, and I’ve little interest in defending my methods to someone who values speaker over spoken.
I have other gripes with Linode, but it’s not exactly par for a ‘disgruntled’ former to speak positively about a business, no?
The problem with the approach you detailed is that it is based on growth rate. If you have more customers coming to you than you have cash on hand to buy servers, you will be forced to turn customers away.
So if you are growing rapidly you will need outside investment, whether equity or debt, in order to grow the business.
In our case we raised equity that helped us to secure additional debt terms and also due to our high growth after product market fit we also needed additional cash to continue to build out our operations.
I'm a fan of bootstrapping businesses and not raising outside capital unless it is necessary, but in our case the choice was to raise capital or turn away customers.
One server, three months, paid off. Two months profit, next server. Linode leased in the beginning! I’m not arrogant enough to assume I could do it better, but I do know the technical side very well, and with an American Express and a decent funnel of people you know you can be profitable in under a year at this. The fundamentals of what is basically a rack-and-stack game, and what is possible with $400 million of capital... it just doesn’t align with how I’d expect a VPS provider to operate, but you’ve convinced the checkbooks to keep it going, I guess.
I actually compare DO and Linode’s approach all the time as an example of VC methodology versus patience. The $400 million raise game is not appropriate for the VPS space. It’s a market literally defined by bootstrappers.
If you hit $1 billion ARR in that market, by the way, I’ll shut up. Knowing what I know about the market, that sounds about as likely as DigitalOcean colonizing Mars, but I’ll applaud you if you do it.
Linode was founded in 2003 and grew to $100MM in revenue in 16 years.
DigitalOcean was founded in 2011 and launched in 2012 and grew to $250MM in revenue in 7 years.
Stands to reason we would need more money over a shorter period of time to achieve that.
The $3MM seed round wasn't used to buy equipment but to fund the business. It improved our balance sheet which allowed us to obtain more leases from vendors which were getting worried about how much exposure they had to us without much of a financial history.
Secondly, we went from signing up 5 customers a day to 250 customers a day after product market fit. When we signed up 5 customers a day I could do most of the customer support myself along with one employee and some backstop from our original company. But at 250 customers signing up every day we obviously needed a dedicated support team, so there were immediate necessities to hiring more people as we went from an "idea/product" to a complete company. We didn't need to hire one more support person, we needed to hire an entire support team over night so that we could have 24/7/365 coverage. Again hard to do that if you don't have capital available to pay salaries. And that's just one team/function of the company that underwent tremendous stress pre and post product market fit.
As for the financial health of the business:
The debt terms require repayment as you yourself know. Whether you use leases or have a single larger structure like debt, either way this isn't "burn" money. You need to repay it with interest.
With an equity raise you can "burn" the money because you never have to repay it, as investors received stock in exchange for the funds.
When you look at the equity side of the business we have raised a total of $123MM to date and the last raise was in July 2015. We haven't raised any outside equity capital to fund the business since then.
Meaning that we are capital efficient and not losing $50MM/yr or some outrageous amount. Otherwise we would have been forced to raise an additional round of funding.
If you have to borrow $100MM to provide the same basic service that you’ve been providing for 8 years, then aren’t these “customers” less customers and more recipients of free services?
Perhaps, that’s the point, no? Buy the remaining VPS market with unsustainable pricing, and then raise the price...
Borrowing money to buy that server is definitely not giving away free stuff. Nor is that pricing unsustainable.
No matter how profitable a business is, there's a limit to how fast it can expand debt-free based on how fast the profits accrue.
I mean not real AWS, but I think there is a market between, say good old VPS ( which is what DO and Linode are before everyone are "Cloud" ) and AWS. Managed solution like Database, Object Storage, Backup, Simple CDN. Which is certainly what DO AND Linode are going into.
There is another trend I spotted, good old Bare Metal is coming back. Useful for base load.
The x86 virtualisation tech just wasn’t up to it back then.