Bayesian stats is nothing more than a rigorous way to transform beliefs + data into a posterior. Yes, flat priors are not always the best choice. That’s not a criticism of Bayesian stats. It’s a statement about how actually formulating a prior is often times the hardest part of a problem. Is Bayesian stats useful for describing or understanding QM? Idk, again, not really it’s job...
Use Bayesian stats, not with an air of suspicion, but a respect for the fact that it will give you the results implied by your data and prior, under your model assumptions. Nothing more, nothing less. By the way, what is the alternative if you find yourself in a situation where your result depends strongly on your prior and you aren’t really sure how to choose your prior? Wave your hands and find an ad hoc frequentist approach? How about just admitting to yourself that your data isn’t enough to make up for the fact that you can’t really quantify your true prior belief?
If you read this and disagree, I sincerely implore you to comment — I just don’t understand the “debate” aspect of Bayesian stats. Some people misunderstand what Bayesian stats is sometimes (very understandable) but I have yet to see a legitimate philosophical or mathematical critique of the Bayesian approach that really made any sense to me. I would like to know if I am wrong though...