In reality, it's not incumbent on researchers to wait for patches at all. You can straightforwardly argue that you're obliged to give users enough of a head start to stop using the product if the risk is intolerable to them, and then disclose ready-or-not.
Otherwise, research suggests that the chances of a vulnerability being independently rediscovered within three months may be as high as 1 in 5 for certain types of defects[1]. This means that even if you don’t know a particular vulnerability is being actively exploited, you’ll eventually find one that’s being quietly exploited by someone. Since you don’t know which one it’ll be, early disclosure at least gives end users the opportunity to apply mitigations and hopefully burns a 0-day being used by an internet bad guy.
[0] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/vulnerability-discl... - “Why are disclosure deadlines necessary?”
[1] https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2928758