> but the scale of a JS interpreter + the fact that it's meant for executing arbitrary code
"the fact that it's meant for executing arbitrary code" is the only part of that statement you need. Avoid executing arbitrary code in unsandboxed/unisolated environments, even in a normal C++ app, even if the code is compiled. The scale doesn't matter.
If you're following best practices and isolating the process, then the number of lines of code shouldn't matter for the actual security. You should assume that a custom-built interpreter designed to run malicious code always has bugs -- whether it's running JS, LUA, whatever -- so you should run that code in a separate, sandboxed process that doesn't have system access.
It's not that the scale doesn't make a difference in complexity, it's that (for the most part) if you find yourself at the point where you're asking questions about the scale, you have already seriously messed up, and you need to go back and rethink your design.
----
The business problem Avast was trying to solve was, "how do we tell whether or not a random Javascript file contains malware?" The answer they came up with was, "we'll run the file in a process with system-access and see what happens."
I'll ask the same question I asked the original commentor: what is a safe way to solve that business problem without process isolation? And if you are correctly isolating the untrusted code, then why does the complexity of the JS interpreter matter?
The JS interpreter isn't there to lay out an interface, it's there to help them understand untrusted code that they find on the filesystem.