There's obviously a question of what you should do when you find out you have been in contact, and that will differ depending on the stage. We probably want to be in a position where everyone who has come into contact with an infected person can get a test asap and if necessary then go into full isolation, not just going out less.
b) It's not 0, so there's still room to reduce the number, even now.
It’s quite obvious that more intrusive measures (lockdowns) are needed now, but what do you do once they’ve Had their effect? You can’t just abolish all measures, as you’d be back to square one. That’s where this comes in handy.
> You'd have to be naive and short-sighted to accept their pinky-promise of privacy-first in this context.
Or, more constructively, you could examine the spec and see whether it’s privacy preserving as promised, and ensure that the deployed software confirms to the spec. How about that?
Or less intrusive measures. We should shelter in place the vulnerable and let everyone else out like Sweden, and this will sort itself out amicably in a few weeks. Leaving the entire population with lasting immunity, preventing any chance of resurgence. [1]
[1] https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesasquith/2020/04/04/no-lock...
Based on what we know, I don't see how you could carve a large enough population group out where you have < 1/300 chance of death and < 1/50 chance of being hospitalized. Your timeline is realistically years to not overrun hospitals, if this is even an acceptable death rate [which it won't be in developed countries]
(Iceland's outbreak is at about the same infection rate as the Bay Area if you estimate with hospitalizations/deaths. Daegu was significantly worse than the Bay Area per capita).
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/contact-tr...
> Let’s start with China, where citizens in hundreds of cities have been required to download cellphone software that broadcasts their location to several authorities, including the local police. The app combines geotracking with other data, such as travel bookings, to designate citizens with color codes ranging from green (low risk) to red (high risk). High-risk individuals can be banned from apartment complexes, offices, and even grocery stores. Many human-rights advocates fear that what has been rolled out as a public-health app is moonlighting as a tool of government espionage and mass discrimination.
> Next, let’s look at South Korea, a democracy that has arguably been more successful than any other in containing the spread of the virus. The government uses several sources, such as cellphone-location data, CCTV, and credit-card records, to broadly monitor citizens’ activity. When somebody tests positive, local governments can send out an alert, a bit like a flood warning, that reportedly includes the individual’s last name, sex, age, district of residence, and credit-card history, with a minute-to-minute record of their comings and goings from various local businesses. “In some districts, public information includes which rooms of a building the person was in, when they visited a toilet, and whether or not they wore a mask,” Mark Zastrow, a reporter for Nature, wrote. “Even overnight stays at ‘love motels’ have been noted.”