Broader answer after reading some of your other comments in this thread: in your ideal, highly secured network environment, none of this is necessary because everything's wired up tighter than a gnat's ass hole. Unfortunately I've never had the pleasure of working for one of those places.
The networks I'm describing aren't "ideal" or "highly secured". I am describing table stakes. While I was at Latacora, most of the clients we engaged with were already at this level of maturity when we joined up.
> The networks I'm describing aren't "ideal" or "highly secured". I am describing table stakes. While I was at Latacora, most of the clients we engaged with were already at this level of maturity when we joined up.
One of the most valuable things you do here is describe things that you believe are table stakes to people and organizations that have never heard of them. Companies like Latacora tend to self-select for clients that are at least aware that security should be a sensible line item in their quarterly budget. There are many many more organizations for whom moving ssh or even port knocking amount to a real improvement to their infrastructure. :-(
https://canary.tools/help/canarytokens
But the concept is really simple: come with any kind of thing you'd want to tripwire --- the AWS key is particularly slick --- and put it somewhere in your infra, then wait for alerts.
What if the attacker does not use software that automatically loads images, like the "canary token" tracking pixels?
What is the attacker opens the files offline?
Canary tokens still work? How?
Why would anyone advise using canary token instead of port knocking? Makes no sense. Why not use both?