Problem is, these switches were not default, people didnt use it because they are dumb, and DJB never cared to properly maintain it. like limiting memory per default, 32bit only builds or such.
Problem is, these switches were not default, people didnt use it because they are dumb, and DJB never cared to properly maintain it. like limiting memory per default, 32bit only builds or such.
Is there a table or formula I can consult that will give this particular dumb person(myself) a handy guide for what amounts of addressable memory will introduce security risks for particular applications? Apparently more than 32-bits is obviously[0] a problem for email; what about databases? Should I feel bad I use more than 64GB of memory in my DB installations? Am I being irresponsible? What about web servers? How much risk does each additional bit of memory add?
My final question is, why does pretty much every other software maintainer not have a problem fixing the memory allocation themselves, obviating the need for external tools to fix these issues? I guess they're going the extra mile!
[0] So obvious a problem that sendmail, postfix, and exim don't require me to apply workarounds for it for some reason. Very irresponsible of them, if you ask me.
Pushing complexity from a very small group (in this case, one person) who knows the system intimately to many orders of magnitude more people that are meant to have a functional knowledge of how it operates but not necessarily be intimate with it is a losing proposition, and not any tenet of how I would consider developing secure software.
If the software is only supposed to be run under process limits, and over a specific process limit all bets are off security wise, then the program should probably check and report problems with large process limits when it starts. Or, as you posit, dying if built for 64 bit, since its assumptions don't necessarily hold.
To me, this is just DJB's ego not allowing him to admit that he made mistakes.