From the other end.
I had this debate with someone in person, and they tried to tell me that since you cannot trust the other end with a self-signed there is no point in protecting your traffic from eavesdroppers on the open AP. That makes no sense to me, but he was passionate enough about it that I let it go. He never could tell me why, so I invite a more learned HNer to complete his argument for him and persuade me.
My take:
There's a difference between identity and encryption, and I think warning users about a site that wants encryption but doesn't necessarily want or need identity is a bigger user-training mistake than anything else browsers have ever done.
Perhaps the lock was the problem there; in that case, if I offer a self-signed certificate, perhaps the better UI experience would be to inform the user in that "Page Info" that their connection is encrypted, but they have no idea if the other end is who they say they are -- and don't bless the page with a lock, bar, anything. The entire construction of https:// needing to imply both encryption and identity doesn't make sense to me, as I see them as distinct concepts. One does not necessarily imply the other, but browsers make it so.
Maybe this is inherent to SSL/TLS itself and I'm the off-base one, but logically it makes sense to me.