> to save $15, uses a self-signed certificate.
Valid SSL can be had from StartSSL for no charge. Money is not the issue, it's browsers completely flipping their shit at a self-signed.
> How does my browser know if I've agreed with your server for a key, or with the man-in-the-middle proxy I've transparently been redirected to?
It doesn't. Which is why, quoting myself and adding emphasis:
> if I offer a self-signed certificate, perhaps the better UI experience would be to inform the user in that "Page Info" that their connection is encrypted, but they have no idea if the other end is who they say they are
This is the function of the big red warning, but it's the implementation of that very warning that I disagree with. However, the traffic in between you and the other end (the other end that you cannot verify, remember) is still encrypted from completely unrelated third parties, so there is still a negligible benefit.
It limits "opened Wireshark and watched you work" to "need to know specifically what I'm after and generate a certificate and poison DNS and ..." A self-signed alone raises the barrier to entry at Starbucks significantly from "really, really easy" to "need to reconnoiter the target and have significant control over the network".