I am not replying to disagree with the spirit of your comment. I just think you should be a bit more careful thinking about it. Obviously she was not jailed for a crime she didn't commit and wasn't convicted of; she was jailed for a crime she did commit and was convicted of. The question is psychological though, about whether the sentencing decision, within the in murky realm of discretion, was based purely on facts completely bound by the scope of the conviction, or whether it extended beyond the scope of the conviction. And the answer is, it always extends beyond the scope of the conviction.

I ask you again to just use your imagination; set aside this particular case and imagine a case where there is absolutely compelling grounds for thinking that the mother is a direct harm to her children, but no admissible evidence to establish that in a legal context. So given the legal "room" to hand down a harsher-than-would-otherwise-be sentence for some separate offense, that doesn't strike me as totally inappropriate or out of line with our expectations about what judges should do. This of course requires the legal establishment of the "room" for judges to do such things, but they have that to a large extent.