I find it interesting that you said: “Only an idiot would say the output of a model has anything to do with the moral question that of how things should be.”
My understanding of the article is that people often share this sentiment, but they often believe this property implies that an optimization procedure will only reflect bias rather than amplify it. Then the author goes on to show that this perceived implication is incorrect.
I.e. your algorithm not understanding an existing bias does not mean it won’t amplify bias — it means it won’t care, which is precisely what allows it to amplify the bias. Because the bias exists in the underlying data, your algorithm can discover and overfit to that bias. Without a “regularizer” to control for this, it’s probably a bad idea to think the algorithm does not amplify bias.
So if my understanding of your comment and the author’s post are right, I think you would both agree that at the end of the day: something needs to explicitly control for the moral question of how things should be, because the general optimization procedures we use do/will not. Is that a fair statement?