I realize the subject isn't something a corporation would touch or code for, nor do they have a 737 in the lineup for 2020, but it would provide me with better understanding of the problem.
I realize the subject isn't something a corporation would touch or code for, nor do they have a 737 in the lineup for 2020, but it would provide me with better understanding of the problem.
I did some napkin math at one point, and the motor on those screwjacks to actuate against the Ethiopian Airlines loads was in the avenue of a 300 ft-lbs if I remember correctly.. (I only remember it was a number similar to what a car engine would be expected to put out).
I didn't know the exact gearing arrangement for the trim wheel, but the simulator footage was enough to convince me it certainly wasn't guaranteed to be practical.
It's good that MCAS will now disable itself without having to disable the trim motors completely. I wish they'd just taken the hit on a new type rating and given up on MCAS completely after the failures. Perhaps new 737 pilots could get training on NG and MAX at the same time?
One thing I'm not seeing much discussion of today (though it was addressed in previous posts about the MAX) is the development process issues that led to the problems in the first place. Some blame it on post-McDonnell-Douglas-merger penny-pinching, non-engineer-indulging managers. Whatever it was, the investigation should have resulted in not just plane modifications, but company ones.
So even with a new type rating, MCAS would still be needed unless the airframe were massively redesigned.