Indeed, a record of proof of the transaction instills more confidence in the system (i.e. votes aren't just in this "black box") and provides a redundancy in the case of issues with the electronic system.
Other than possible cost savings, the only useful benefit of electronic voting is if it lets people vote from home/vote more conveniently. Requiring a paper backup nullifies that benefit, and making it optional damages the usefulness of having a paper backup in the first place and adds privacy problems.
In WA the ballot has a tab you peel off and can track through a webpage. It’s basically the system outlined above but we actually fill out a paper ballot then mail it in. The postage is prepaid.
This solves basically all problems and works great.
It’s independently verifiable. It’s anonymous. It’s accessible.
If elections in my district are historically won by a 10-20% margin, and my corporation directly employs 20% of the people in the district, then I think I could make blackmail scale just fine.
Yes.
> Do you think you can reliably get away with that?
Robber barons did reliably get away with it throughout the nineteenth century. That's the whole reason that you don't get to take a copy of your ballot home today.
> It’s totally unrealistic
Well, somebody forgot to tell reality.
My ballot gets mailed to my house. I fill it out in my kitchen.