The fact that the US will always need steel helps ensure that they _will_ always be friends with China, so long as they also specialize in something that China needs.
Globalization is a part of it, but I don't think it's sufficient in itself to keep the peace.
Their inability to produce high octane gasoline was also instrumental in the defeat of the Luftwaffe, as it meant their aircraft could not perform up to the level of the Allied aircraft.
The Japanese in WW2 also failed to secure a supply of oil, with similar results.
The interesting thing about a future modern war, however, is that modern weapons are too expensive and take too long to produce, so it'll be fought with whatever is in stock and will be over before supply lines matter. I hope we never find out if that is true or not the hard way.
If all you have left to fight with is improvised weapons, then it continues with that.
I would argue that very expensive, complex machines are the Tiger tank mistake all over again. Mechanically unreliable because of the complexity, but when it worked it was completely unmatched. One Tiger tank defeated 50 Russian tanks in the battle of Kursk, if I remember correctly.
But the cheaper, mass produced tanks of the allies won out because they could be fielded in much greater numbers.
and see how well (or poorly) that work. Look at afganistan. Look at iraq. Insurgents continue to fight, and the usa just cannot completely win.
A war is won on ideology, not weapons.
The US cannot win those because it is unwilling to do what is necessary (indiscriminate killing) to win.
> A war is won on ideology, not weapons.
I don't see much evidence for that in the history of warfare. For example, during WW1, the fortunes of the armies ebbed and flowed with the ebb and flow of who had the technical advantage in the air war.
If they don't want anything from their trading partners, the output of those industries can just as easily be directed to their own population.
tomorrow, China may learn to specialize in that something.
It is never a good strategy to depend on the weakness of others for the long term.
After all, a) humankind developed steel mills in the absence of any steel mills at all, and b) multiple countries have developed much more complicated things in secrecy from each other (like atomic weapons and orbital rockets and radar), so it seems like it should be doable.
It's to your advantage to give up your skills if the cost of regaining them if you need to is smaller than the comparative advantage of having China make steel for you in the meantime.
Geopolitical considerations may mean there's a business advantage to having it made in China as opposed to elsewhere, but as we've seen with the US pandemic response, there are sectors where it's just plain stupid to believe that expertise can be summoned up as needed, and that it's somehow cheaper not to pay for it in the interim. Government isn't a household, and you can't restart having expertise like canceling Netflix for a few months.
you'd imagine they, upon acquiring said expertise, would write it down so that it is permanently available to others. What happens to the expertise if the person with it dies in an accident or old age?
Some of it is trade secrets and so when the company is wound down it's sold as IP to another place.
Some expertise is contextual to the actual build of the equipment. Having a manual that said replace this O-ring every week in a blower or you'll suffer failures may not actually be expert knowledge anymore, It could be all that is stopping you from losing a million dollar piece of equipment or it could be what's causing you to lose productivity for an hour every week in a pagan ritual to the sacred maintenance document.
Being an expert and being able to chronicle that expertise are not just separate skills they're separate tasks. They might not know what is worth highlighting or they might prefer to read a book than to take on the extra task of writing it down.
The Economics jargon is "real option value". When you have engineers making widgets of type A, it's easy to get them to make types B, C, and D should the need arise. This potential to do other things has real value even if in fact you never do them.
Real option value should always be evaluated when choosing a course of action, but since it's about non-existent things, it's usually skipped. (Edit: calling it "real" must be economist humor.)
Ricardo didn't know about, or chose to ignore, real option value. In the classic England = cloth, Portugal = wine trade, Portugal would be better off making cloth because of real option value.
Advantages are not static; they're path-dependent and time-dependent variables, and treating them properly as such can really change the optimum strategy. The path dependence means that sometimes, instead of always maximally exploiting your existing advantages, you can make a short-term sacrifice to gradually create advantages that you didn't originally have.
Even if automation removes the labor cost arbitrage factor, the market distortion due to other factors is unlikely to encourage a spurt in manufacturing unless the US also decides to intervene in markets.
Additionally, mask making in the US has very low comparative value. Us workers and business have much better products they to produce.
Dave Chappelle hit the nail on the head in one of his standup routines "I wanna wear Nikes, I don’t wanna make those things. Stop trying to give us Chinese jobs"
Absolute advantage is when you are best/cheapest at producing something. Comparative advantage is when you have the lowest opportunity cost to produce something. Others may be able to produce it cheaper but they have something more profitable to produce.
Example might be steel mills, USA probably can produce steel, but it is much more profitable to produce end products (machines, tools, cars). So USA could be the best at producing steel and machines, but it ends up producing machines giving China comparative advantage to produce steel (let's imagine they do not know how to produce machines in a cheap way).
It's quite a strange concept.
There are two obvious problems above. First, 2 years, will we even need N95 masks in two years? Second, I said I'd make them, but I cannot promise I can make them cheaper than China can.
For many things, including probably making N95 masks, we can no longer just decide to make them now without reconstructing that entire logistical tail, all the myriad of small manufacturers, and train people with specialized know-how and the years of experience that only exist in the presence of a vibrant and active manufacturing ecosystem.
(and yes, our standards institute also was testing the resulting product)
Even the north koreans seem to have bought some machines, judging by their propaganda photos. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23741907
As far as making cheaper than china, the following are old links for non-N95 masks, they may be stale:
Compare masks per month: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-autos-...
with masks per day: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_jWt-4YKBq4
Note too that I have no expertise in either building a business or designing mask making machines, so I'll need to hire people as experts in both of those which will take time. Probably my mask making machine experts will be experts in designing machines (engineers), but not masks and so they will have to learn what works and doesn't.
These toy examples are useful as an introduction but basically irrelevant to modern political debates around economics, we need to move past discussing trade like we do in "Econ 101."
Certifications take time, masks are simple, testing takes time.
This is a government problem, not a manufacturing problem.