Both are existential threats with high degrees of uncertainty.
Both are existential threats with high degrees of uncertainty.
- It could be in the interest of a government to make sure people aren't spreading what they would consider disinformation
- It is then in the government's interest to prevent the spread of disinformation, perhaps to identify those spreading it or those who may be inclined to spread it
- It's not a stretch then to consider that it could be in the interest of government, particularly one with malicious or authoritarian intent, to tap into private conversations of people suspected of spreading disinformation.
I find it particularly concerning, because I assume that what people within a society would consider disinformation is 1) inconsistent, 2) ephemeral.
You note that government may want to target individuals to prevent the spread of misinformation more effectively.
The others note that misinformation spreaders may want to target inviduals to spread misinformation more effectively.
Sounds like individual-targeting is a weapon for both sides.
Imagine being able to compile the cheapest pressure point for everyone in the world using surveillance and then exploiting it on a industrial scale. Most modern surveillance is in a legally ambiguous area of the law.
In theory you can target anyone with habitual use of a computer or with friends who use computers a lot for very cheap.