The Three Sides of Risk
collaborativefund.com
collaborativefund.com
(b) en.wikipedia says that "freshwater economists" are called that because they were associated with the Chicago school[2], on the great lakes. A second connotation, for sailors, is that a freshwater sailor will run risks that a salt water sailor will explicitly incur many costs to avoid, precisely because the tail-end is not as serious within rescue distance of shore.
(for more nautical metaphor, compare brown-water navy vs blue-water navy)
[1] currently back down to 3,2% https://www.arbeit.swiss/dam/secoalv/de/dokumente/publikatio... (In the 90s it was briefly even above 5%.)
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saltwater_and_freshwater_econo...
Bonus clip: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9JcNWaMXTc
To mebi du amalof da belek; da belek fosho na du amalof to. (You may love space; space does not love you.)
At the end of the video they list all of the interviewees, all of whom had subsequently died. If you think about the amount of mass in the snow 9+ rocks, trees etc) and the churning dynamics you realize all those "techniques" you might learn are mumbo jumbo.
We show this video to our students (it's so old it's on a DVD), while teaching them how to avoid likely avalanche zones in the first place. Despite that I still carry an avalanche pole and beacon.
Too much effort is often put into preventing low cost issues and scolding those who make them.
Beyond hurting morale, it reduces efficiency and innovation because everyone is afraid to make even a trivial mistake.
What I'm trying to say is...
"Move fast and break shit! ...But maybe not that shit over there because it's actually quite critical"
And "considerable" Avalanche conditions result in far more deaths and "high" or "extreme", because they offer just enough stability to allow skiers to build a false sense of security.
My point is just that professionals of these activities have developed frameworks for evaluating risk and I think it's interesting how they might be applied to other disaplines.
I liked this PDF so much I bought the book.
Speaking of avalanches and covid, they share an interesting property:
You don’t know how close you are to a catastrophe until it’s too late. It’s fine until it’s not. And in many cases you’re proper fucked. There’s very little in between.
Until that moment, many people see any precautions as unnecessary, boring, patronising, paranoid, and so on. Be that because they are reckless, clueless, or both.
And once people do die, everybody is up in arms about the authorities not doing anything, the victims being at fault, why didn’t we do intervene, it would have been so easy. And so on.
There has to be a name for auch a thing.
So as someone who knows about avalanches, it is frustrating to see careless attitudes towards covid.
1. The odds you will get hit.
2. The average consequences of getting hit.
3. The tail-end consequences of getting hit.
It claims that tail-end consequences which are low probability , high impact events like coronavirus pandemics are all that matter. One thing, I learnt from insurance industry is that a lot of people underestimate the odds of getting hit. We are inherently reactive creatures and not proactive.
* I insure my car, because I'm not a good driver - I don't generally drive though, and would prefer to go without, but my wife wants one even though it would be cheaper to Uber everywhere that we actually travel.
* I own an apartment, and building corp levies include insurance on the building (but don't insure contents). This is an insurance I would keep even if it wasn't mandatory; the tail risk is too expensive for me to recover from.
* I have health insurance (in Australia, where the public health system is good) only for tax reasons (it would cost me almost as much _not_ to have insurance). Public health system is sufficient that this would not generally be required.
I should probably insure more (life, income protection, probably home contents, maybe but probably not actually useful health insurance).
It's not sufficient only to consider the probability of a (binary) outcome. What's the severity?
I did some serious camping as a teenager and despite being mere children, we were cognizant of the consequences of not paying attention as several other teenagers had previously died doing some of the same activities.
While you can’t get this kind of insurance from most brokers, you can certainly make investments that will pay off in the case of a nuclear war (e.g. aerial defense, subterranean shelters, etc). The entire military-industrial complex is built around selling this kind of insurance.
But I’ve been saying for decades that “risk” is not the chances of something happening, which is how most people understand it. Risk is (the chance of something happening) x (the consequences of it happening).
Imagine a 2x4 beam, 24’ long, lying on the floor, and I tell you to walk along the top of it without touching the floor. If you do, I’ll give you a sherbet lemon.
Now imagine it’s a 2x4, 24’ long between two office buildings, the one you’re in is on fire and this is the only way out.
The chances of you falling off the beam are the same (within a margin of error, assuming a non-windy day, etc. etc), but the risk to your life is much much higher in the second case.
Risk encompasses consequence, and it always surprises me how few people understand that in meetings when I’m describing a new approach, or criticizing a new service conformation.
All that means is that you haven't properly understood the risk, IMHO :)
Edit: actually I went back and read your comment again and I misread the second part of your comment to indicate that I didn't understand something. I get what you mean, but I think tail risk can get ignored a bit more when you're quantifying risk, because it is very difficult to quantify.
A likely risk of time spent outside is sunburn.
A long term risk of time spent outside is skin cancer.
A long tail risk of time spent outside is getting hit by lightning.