A slightly deeper analysis would ask first "What are the incentive structures in a system where people can seamlessly migrate from one provider to another?".
We have already seen that Facebook, as a monopolistic provider, is too big to fail, and it can keep paying the meagre fines for its non-compliance with the rules, while lobbying and threatening[0] and exploiting its election-influencing power to ensure the regulations don't significantly limit its assault on users' privacy.
It's not hard to imagine that if 20 different companies were competing for users, they might act in ways that better protect users' privacy. In fact the competitive pressure on them would be twofold, since not only could users move to different providers, but users could also refuse to connect to a friend on a network whose policies they do not trust.
[0] https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/sep/22/facebook-...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook%E2%80%93Cambridge_Ana...
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/facebook-gave-some-companies-pr...
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/fact-check/201...
> But some researchers dispute that ad-targeting is any different than selling data.
> "As a data scientist, I am shocked that anyone continues to believe this claim," wrote Michael Kosinski, assistant professor at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business, in a New York Times opinion piece. "Every time you click on a Facebook ad, Facebook sells data on you to that advertiser."
> "This is such a basic property of online targeted advertising that it would be impossible to avoid, even if Facebook somehow wanted to."