But there's plenty of tiny details that are obsolete as well, e.g. it describes the timestamp which is no longer used and usually filled with random data these days.
There are many barriers to an https connection, and this is one of them.
Another is the version race, meaning browsers as recent as 2012 are no longer compatible with today's https sites.
For the Web (Meaning HTTP/S), compatibility back past 5-6 years seems kind of pointless. There's to much changing to fast at too many layers to be a really good target, unless you are serving an actually static site (Which is not a bad thing, it's what I do). Even then, HTTPS still has value, as it can prevent ISP's from injecting advertisements. I don't believe this is currently a large issue in the US, but I remember a recent discussion about bad behaviour by ISP's in India and other countries.
Edit: I do however believe that (for a static site on https) it is a good idea to allow a fall back to http, assuming of course that you are fine with the contents being mitm'd. Also, I think the Gopher is a good thing to serve in this kind of situation.
Public Issuers generally backdate certificates by a small amount of time to allow for that one hour. This is permitted (unlike backdating to avoid other rules) by the Baseline Requirements, so you should find you don't need to wait before using the certificates you are issued.
Thanks, but no. I had to wait about 12 hours to deploy replacement certificates after Heartbleed, in order to balance cert errors with loss of privacy. A large number of the clients I had to support interpret the dates as local time, which isn't helpful when they're in the western hemisphere and GoDaddy wouldn't backdate certs at all. Last I had a cert issued, DigiCert set not before to the order time even for re-issues or duplicates, so that was a lot easier to manage.
Random: Now all 32 bytes are random
Session ID: This will now all be random if we've never talked to this server before or if we believe it speaks TLS 1.3
Cipher suites: There are newer suites [with much shorter names] for TLS 1.3 because some parameters are now fixed.
SNI: This is still there (work on Encrypted SNI which became Encrypted Client Hello is ongoing)
NEW Supported versions: Compliant servers pick the newest version they recognise from a list the client provides.
NEW Key share: A TLS 1.3 client proposes one or more (Elliptic curve) Diffie Hellman key agreements. Most servers will accept one of them.
OK, on to the Server Hello...
Random: Again all 32 bytes are random unless the server speaks TLS 1.3 (or newer) and has the impression at this point that the client does not. In this case the server overwrites a few of the bytes with the ASCII "DOWNGRD" (downgrade). A TLS 1.2 (or older) client sees no significance in this, but a TLS 1.3 client is alerted that somebody is meddling, because it's extremely unlikely that a server randomly spells "DOWNGRD" and also only knows an older protocol version.
Also, as a special case TLS 1.3 servers scribble over the entire random byte sequence with SHA256("HelloRetryRequest") if they wish you to try TLS 1.3 hello again with a different key share because all your proposals were unsuitable.
Session ID: The random nonsense from the client is echo'd back in TLS 1.3
Cipher suite: Still whichever suite the server picked.
NEW Supported versions: TLS 1.3 or better servers will echo back versions they support.
NEW Key share: Assuming the Client's proposed key shares are acceptable in TLS 1.3 the server answers with a share of their own here and then...
In TLS 1.3 and newer everything else is encrypted. Client and server have performed DH key agreement, so now they both know a random secret which they will use to begin encrypting any subsequent messages.
Certificate: is an example of something that's now encrypted. Also in TLS 1.3 the specification follows real world practice that this isn't necessarily a "chain" just one leaf certificate plus any other certificates that might help the client reach a trust decision.
The TLS 1.3 protocol is a relatively nice shape in its natural form, but what you see on the wire is spelled very weirdly because this is the only way for it to pass various rusty middleboxes and not blow up poorly implemented legacy servers out there in the real world.