Consider the claim that's it's a loss if the company shows poor returns. If it had good returns, the anti-auction folks would claim some small group is getting rich off what used to be a public good. Poor returns for the company means that the auction is limiting the plunder and that sounds like a win to me.
And why is this a loss for the government treasury? If the returns are poor, there wasn't much more juice to squeeze from the orange, right? So it sounds like the government (and often the taxpayers, sort of) are getting as much as they can for very little work.
I'm much more sympathetic to the deeper arguments about structure of auctions and how they might be improved. Why not auction the spectrum off for a shorter time? Maybe use smaller chunks of spectrum? The auctions are just a competitive algorithm and they can become more accurate with finer resolution.
Companies also lose as they have fixed liabilities on their balance sheet. If companies are hamstrung by debt then they do not have resources to invest in their network, subscribers suffer.
Who exactly wins for this grand experiment in top-down auction design?
Citation needed.
>there is a counter factual for which empirical data exists
And yet you provide none.
A telco could never be overburdened by the rev-share in the same way as a upfront payment. If the rev share is too high so using the spectrum isn't economical, the telco could simply not build out (and probably lose their license, which is OK for them, it wasn't economical). If the prepaid price was too high, they still have to pay it from spectrum activities and other activities; but they probably can't sell the spectrum to retire the debt, because the price was too high.
Of course, some of that requires a competetent regulator with clear authority, as well as not too much corruption and reasonably swift court systems to handle disputes. But a point in time, single payment auction works better with those things too.
It's also easier to bid higher in rev-share, because you don't need to finance that net present value; it's just going to be built into the price of service, and your competitors will likely have similar rev-shares (depending on the auction process), so it's going to be built into everyone's prices.
I think there's also some value in a stream of payments rather than a one time payment. Although you can exchange one for the other with financial tools, a government may find a stream of payments to it matches well with the stream of payments it's making.
There's also an argument that the government doesn't actually realise any advantage from selling off the risk: if the telecom companies fail, it's still the government's problem. So the government ends up paying extra for something it can't actually use.
Auctions happen at a point in time and leave alot of value on the table. Spectrum purchased in 1999 is worth much more today. If the government retained title to spectrum and allowed for smaller chunks, smaller players could participate and compete in the market -- look at how dial up ISPs in the 90s drove prices for internet from $40/mo in the early 90s to <$10 in 1999 or so.
The mobile market is very different -- we pay more for a commodity that gets cheaper to deliver over time; AT&T wireless margins are >50% for a commodity service as a result of the limited competition.
> It's a loss because a big, capitalized winner takes all auction benefits a small number of entities with big pockets.
This is the exact opposite of what the parent poster was arguing against which was the claim that the TelCos had poor returns (ie they were NOT particularly beneficial to those entities).