In the background there is a war going on, but it isn't what you think. It is a war between malware creators and OS creators.
From my perspective it goes like this:
To "identify" malware you need signatures. Signatures need valid certificates. Signing keys get lost (or worse stolen), bad actors need to get identified and their identity revoked.
If you don't have signatures you will end up with polymorphic malware. (Brew, pip, ruby gems, npm make me uneasy with how much external trust they require!)
To stop persistence you need some system immutability and secure startup / boot.
If you don't have secure startup / boot you will allow persistence in ways it may be impossible to remove.
If you don't have an encrypted disk protected by a passphrase, a lost device means your personal data is now potentially now "public". If you don't also have the other above protections having a passphrase at this point may be meaningless.
I use an iPhone because it boots from ROM and a DFU Restore wipes all mutable firmware. The flash, where my data is stored is encrypted. When I can, I will also use an Apple Silicon Mac because it works the same way.
Hardware products and operating systems from other vendors and sources do not have these protections. Some attempt to, but the implementations are very flawed or poor - I choose not to use them with my personal information.
For me, Apple products really are designed to protect my personal information.