Take Canvas fingerprints. If you added a bit of randomness to how the browser renders pixels, the fingerprint would change each time you measured it. It would still be unique, but it would be a useless tracking tool.
Presumably I'm not the first person to come up with this, is there a reason it isn't done?
There's more info here if you're curious: https://brave.com/privacy-updates-4/
Here is Brave's take: https://brave.com/brave-fingerprinting-and-privacy-budgets/
They basically fuzz (randomize) the timing precision that you can do, so you can't use timing to leak information across 2 different processes.
>"As of Firefox 57.0.4, Mozilla was reducing the resolution of JavaScript timers to help prevent timing attacks, with additional work on time-fuzzing techniques planned for future releases."
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerabil...
Maybe similar tactics could help prevent finger-printing!
https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/4.1-Extensions#smal...
Notably, to me this isn't necessarily about beating the resistFingerprints setting, because I can't use that setting. For good or for ill, it breaks too much of the web.
Literally the first bullet
>It is trivial to detect RFP and when you change a RFP metric, you lose your "herd immunity"
having a randomized fingerprint is a fingerprint value in and of itself. That may leak more entropy bits if you have a fairly common hardware configuration
Also, regarding webaudio fingerprinting, afaik it's not a real threat.
https://github.com/WebAudio/web-audio-api/pull/2224#discussi...
https://github.com/w3cping/tracking-issues/issues/53#issueco...
>As I said, I can't use RFP, it breaks too many sites.
Weird. I only know a few sites that break with RFP on, and I don't use them frequently.
that doesn't work because the sites can just take multiple samples and average the results.