2. Someone can register your domain first and you won't even be able to migrate in (at least without customer support).
2. Someone can register your domain first and you won't even be able to migrate in (at least without customer support).
Also, strict proof may not be necessary, there's the Cloudflare/Route53 way with a pool of nameservers used for verification. Cloudflare has a blog post explaining that: https://blog.cloudflare.com/whats-the-story-behind-the-names... (Disclaimer: I'm not sure if account-specific combos are attacker-proof. Definitely better than generic ones though.)
Given the decentralized nature of DNS it's very simple to set things up before you change the nameservers, and this is widely considered to be the best practice. This also solves the "two accounts trying to claim a domain at the same time".
The way Amazon does it sure helps mitigate it. I'm just not sold on the idea that it's their responsibility to solve this. And I suspect they do this for other reasons as well, like spreading out across multiple TLDs.
Yes, apparently I didn't think this through. That leaves the nameserver combo method.
> Given the decentralized nature of DNS it's very simple to set things up before you change the nameservers, and this is widely considered to be the best practice. This also solves the "two accounts trying to claim a domain at the same time".
That only solves the someone trying to snatch your domain after they find out your nameservers have changed. They can still initiate the claim before you do for any other reason.
> I'm just not sold on the idea that it's their responsibility to solve this.
That's an opinion (flawed if you ask me), and has nothing to do with whether proof of ownership is technically possible. And if the pool of combos is large enough and uniquely assigned to each account it's certainly a technical solution to the problem.
And don't get me wrong, I think the solution that Amazon and CloudFlare use are better than nothing. Having safe guards against people misconfiguring things are always helpful, and I'm sure it would result in fewer support cases.
No, the problem is people can have their domains snatched even without misconfiguring things. You keep saying it's the users' fault, when the same could happen when users follow whatever you consider best practices.
Some TLDs check for this, they won't transfer a domain to new name servers unless they already respond as authoritative name servers for that domain.
The argument is that someone else could set up a zone before you. But there can't be duplicate zones, and the user should create this zone before changing the name servers. There are mitigation strategies that have already been discussed, but other than being a Nice Thing (tm) and likely lowering the volume of support tickets I don't see how this is the providers fault. You set the name servers before checking that you had control over said name servers, or forgot to change them when moving away.
One of two things happen:
1. Both are allowed to initiate the claim before verification comes through (Cloudflare allows this, not sure about DO); result: domain snatched by attacker;
2. Only one initiation is allowed, in which case the attacker denied you your setup until a support ticket, and even then, how do you prove you’re not the attacker in the support ticket?
Either case, disruption can be caused by an attacker.
You keep saying mitigation is just a nice thing and providers are not responsible. What a weird hill to die on. Are you a provider?
On Amazon you can request a delegation set, which means a combination of four name servers. Do that enough times and I'm sure you'll have all the possible variations that could exist. For every Amazon account you can request 100 delegation sets, but it's easy to scale this out over multiple accounts. I'm also willing to bet you can easily get that limit raised to thousands of delegation sets by just telling support you're going to use the account for hosting tons of zones. I don't know the specifics of how CloudFlare does it, but I assume you're more than welcome to do the same, programatically.
There's no hill to die on. I don't work for a provider, and how is that even relevant? Seems like a weird straw man argument or something.
The potential risks of this is blown way out of proportions. You're still in control over the domain, just not the zone. Do stupid things, win stupid prices? In this case, letting someone else control your zone because you failed to understand how DNS works.
Defunct registrars is a interesting problem. If they don't have functional name servers then it is also very likely that they don't have a functional portal and customer support in order to change the NS records. Defunct registrars are thus a pretty manual problem, so sacrificing security for easier process seems like a bad deal.
A best practice should make the common case easy but secure, and the uncommon case secure and possible.