Never forget the lesson in "Using Metadata to find Paul Revere": https://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2013/06/09/using-metad...
> Administering devices with network settings is convenient, but rapidly vanishing because there's no technical difference between you administering your local network and a totalitarian ISP administering their users.
Your ability to terminate things locally means that finding Paul Revere with metadata isn't needed. It's a lot of work when you can just directly look at all your country's traffic.
What everyone everywhere can resist, though, is corporate surveillance. That's the aim people should have.
It is perhaps worth considering carefully if exposing most people to surveillance they are not equipped to defend against from lots of entities (such as with typical DNS) is an improvement over something like Oblivious DoH. It might even offer some protection against some totalitarian governments in some cases.
Again, you're completely right. Protecting people from corporate surveillance is very important! I just think it might be worth considering that we don't have a perfect answer at the moment, and some subtlety in how we think about this might be in order.
What we can do with design and architecture is make each breach of communications security consume greater resources than unencrypted DNS, unencrypted HTTP, and unencrypted email.
Historically, radicalism in the form of whole-protocol-suite replacements has often seen little in the way of adoption. Whereas incrementalism in the form of tunnels and other protocol amendments has been much more successful.
Unsure of the status of non-government large, well funded groups of people with guns there is though.