As for the write-up itself, I honestly can’t believe they published this much detail. The feds and FireEye must be very concerned that folks are exposed to this right now and those folks don’t know it.
As for the write-up itself, I honestly can’t believe they published this much detail. The feds and FireEye must be very concerned that folks are exposed to this right now and those folks don’t know it.
Targeted, sophisticated, nation-state threats are real and have been documented in the FLAME, DUQU, DARKHOTELs of the world. Supply-chain attacks are not new either, Juniper was compromised 4 years ago and backdoored into their firmware, NOTPETYA compromised a legitimate accounting software company, and ransomware has been delivering through MSPs for quite some time.
Professionals look at indicators posted and techniques leveraged and come to their own conclusions.
This is not standard malware. This was not a script kiddie.
The old school concept of a script kiddie was someone who had a limited skill set that consisted of downloading exploits and trying everything to see what worked. Traditionally, a script kiddie didn't develop any of their own exploits.
Nowadays these people are known as Network Security Consultants and they are paid very well.
[0] https://www.computerworld.com/article/2483923/poison-ivy--us...
I've noticed this since the NK hacks in 2014 and it's bothered me. Why is this the reaction even in technologically savvy quarters?
Tech nerds like to describe things as boring, obvious, and easy to do, it makes them feel smart.
Certain politics lead people to assume that government is incompetent and therefore obviously it was an unsophisticated attack that breached them.
A lot of IT workers think every instance of a hack is an example of underfunding the IT department, or the IT department wastes the budget they do have.
I would say history leads people to assume that government is incompetent. We have plenty of evidence on which to form this conclusion
>A lot of IT workers think every instance of a hack is an example of underfunding the IT department,
Again this is also drawn from a place of experience, many of us have seen first hand organization refusing to put in the money needed to properly secure systems until AFTER their is a compromise, and then the money is only allocate for a few months to resolve the exact compromise that impacted the organization never really changing the security posture of the company / organization.
This pattern is repeated over and over and over again
Security has a certain cachet which makes people want to sound like experts and one way to do that is to minimize others’ accomplishments, implicitly saying that they aren’t challenging to you.
Dunning Kruger doesn’t cover the entirety of what’s happening, but there’s some pathology at work here.
Example: "Continents move around", "time slows if you're fast", and "turtles, all the way down" are all similarly ridiculous unless you've studied these subjects. People see the first two receiving lots of applause[1] and start making claims that to them are just as believable.
[1]: Or they see footnotes being correlated with "serious science" and start adding footnotes.]2]
[2]: For details on how references make people appear smart, see Feynman, 1968: Cargo-Culting. Also scientism
[3]: A heuristic that in our experiments succeeded in identifying 0.65 of the lower 20-quantile of wannabe basement-warriors is to count the occurrences of the terms /threat (model|actor)/, /sigint/, /retcon/, /psyops/, /opsec/, and the phrase /everyone does it/. Exclude any >= 1.
This annoys me.
1) I'm equally breached whether the hacker used a sophisticated attack or not.
2) A "nation-state" attacker is more than willing to use "unsophisticated" attacks to accomplish their goals.
In fact, a "nation-state" attacker is probably less likely to use "sophisticated" attacks as they will want to save those for the cases where they really need to get through security.
This could be a stuxnet type attack looking for a particular facility, or something far worse at a time when the US is most vulnerable.
One of many examples:
https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/528/44...
Also, it’s standard practice to write these things up in full detail.
Just from the target I'd suspect it is not someone doing it for the lulz, but I didn't see anything in OPs quote that indicates that it must be a nation state.
Edit: a quick counterfactual here. If this is so easy and so valuable, why is it so rare?
Designed, as in back-of-the-envelope chicken scratching? Sure. You can reduce almost any exploit to "compromise system or org, leverage compromise to go after another system or org" and any stealth measures reduce to something like "hide your own efforts among legitimate signals, and use cutouts to make them harder to trace back".
I'm not sure what you think counts as "sophistication", but thinking up the specifics of multiple stages, and executing each stage without errors that would expose the other stages to detection isn't easy, and takes time and patience by many people with diverse skills working in concert.
Sure, each specific link in the chain may not look difficult, but those were just the solutions that worked in isolation when tried in whatever testing environment(s) the threat-actor operates (not to mention funding the "blue team" that operates it, because you don't want your unsuccessful attempts to tip your hand), and then deployed in sequence.
Or were you under the impression that this whole effort was created de-novo and worked (correctly, might I add) without being detected the very first time each component was tried?