For Visa it was 835ms for valid, 762ms for dummy, prefix and check digit appears to be checked client side.
For Visa it was 835ms for valid, 762ms for dummy, prefix and check digit appears to be checked client side.
Also in infosec: what is old is new. We still find shitty comparison routines (timing attacks) and SQL injection... some day :)
Or more likely "someone will notice, eventually"
If the rand function produces uniform random numbers, then with enough samples the signal comes out ontop the noise.
If it is non-uniform, then with enough samples you can determine the non uniformity, and you are at square 1 again.
Use proper security instead of obscurity.
And it's not a thing anyone has a legitimate interest in submitting more than that per second.
I.e. the padding to add is (5 - duration_of_operation) with duration of operation being far lower than 5 s.
What would be a proper first step to harden API for timing attacks?
An easy mitigation would be to just drop the card number into a queue and process asynchronously without waiting and returning to the user.