Perhaps the disconnect here is between fundamentally different ways of measuring "good" or "doing good".
Your argument here and EA arguments in general are based on an axiomatic assumption that good done to anyone is equally valuable, that all people worldwide now (and in some analyses, all hypothetical future people) have an equal claim on your help.
IMHO this axiom does not match the "built-in moral system" of most people. To start with an illustrative example (obviously you can imagine many less extreme comparisons), for most people, the welfare of their child is unquestionably much, much more important than the welfare of some other child across the globe. For most people saving the life of another child across the globe at the cost of the life of their child would not be a neutral exchange of things of equal value, it would be a horrifically unbalanced "trade". This is completely understandable even for undeniably good people doing lots of good. So this extreme establishes a baseline that the axiom of "saving every life is equally valuable" can not be accepted by most people (and accepting that axiom is not a requirement for "being good" or "doing good"), there is some difference, and the only question is about the scale and of that difference, what factors apply, etc.
And coming from an (incompatible) axiomatic assumption that it's plausible that helping someone in your community can be more valuable than protecting two people with no connection to you, all these other strategies start making some sense.
Looking at this from a Kantian 'moral duty' perspective, some people (perhaps including you) have an implied moral duty to care about everyone, equally. And some people have an implied moral duty to care about their community more than "strangers". Obviously those two approaches are incompatible, but IMHO both are frequently encountered, and I don't believe that "good people" and "people who do lots of good" always subscribe to the first concept of moral duty, there seems to be a lot of good works done based on the latter understanding.